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Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation of Commercial Bank M&As
“You can observe a lot just by watching.”
Lawrence Peter (Yogi) Berra
Under the semi-strong efficient markets hypothesis, stock prices react positively (negatively) to
public events and announcements that informed market participants expect will increase (decrease) long-
run firm value.  However, realized long-run outcomes need not be consistent with short-run market
reactions.  One reason is that the public information set about the firm—including information
idiosyncratic to the firm, its competitors, its customers, its production technology, or its regulation—may
change unexpectedly after the event in a way that exacerbates, mutes, or reverses the impact of the short-
run event on long-run firm value.  Another reason is that the event being priced in the short-run may itself
be poorly understood by market participants.  Indeed, if the information necessary to value the event is
not in the public information set—say, because the event is a new kind of phenomenon—then even in the
absence of post-event informational surprises, the initial reaction of a semi-strong efficient market may be
an inefficient long-run predictor of firm value.
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of large banking companies over the past two decades have
been difficult to value, as well as difficult to execute, for both of the above reasons.  First, the banking
industry experienced a series of substantial and unpredictable strategic shocks during the 1980s and
1990s.  Examples include the rapid commoditization of consumer credit markets (home mortgages, credit
card loans, auto financing), the disappointing performance of a thought-to-be-promising business model
(Internet banking), a large merger that forced Congress’ hand on repealing Glass-Steagall restrictions
earlier than expected (CitiCorp-Travelors), and slower-than-expected geographic integration (there is still
no banking company with full service branches in all 50 states).  It is reasonable to expect, however, that
the frequency and magnitude of these types of informational shocks will diminish over time as the2
industry approaches a structural, technological, and regulatory equilibrium, thus stabilizing the
informational environment in which bank mergers are valued and executed.
Second, because decades of strict regulation had prevented commercial banks from operating
across state lines and product market boundaries (e.g., insurance, brokerage, securities underwriting),
M&As involving large, publicly traded banking companies were a relatively new phenomenon in the
1980s and into the 1990s.  There was little reliable information available to the market, or even to the
merging banks themselves, regarding which types of mergers would create the most value or which
banking companies would be good at planning and executing mergers—in other words, there were no
established best practices for merging two large banking companies.  As more commercial bank mergers
occurred over time, however, one might expect such information and best practices to emerge, and that
this information would eventually spillover from one bank to other banks, and from these banks to
investors.  Stated differently, it is reasonable to expect that banks would learn how to better plan and
execute mergers by observing previous bank mergers, and it is similarly reasonable that investors would
learn how to better value bank mergers as they observed and evaluated more of them.  It is this potential
for “information spillover” and “learning-by-observing” in which we are most interested in this study.
An intensive process of mergers and acquisitions has transformed U.S. commercial banking from
an industry best characterized by thousands of small, traditional, privately held firms shielded from
geographic and product market competition, to an industry now characterized by increasingly large and
technologically progressive banks in vigorous competition to sell a wide range of financial services.  This
massive industry consolidation was expected to enhance efficiency by eliminating banks that were
operating below efficient scale, exposing local banks to competition from other markets, and reallocating
assets away from inefficient bank managers.  But academic studies have found little systematic evidence
that the stock market expects bank mergers to create value, that bank mergers improve financial
performance in the long-run, or that the market can predict post-merger financial performance.  Some
plausible explanations have been offered for these empirical findings, for example: managerial hubris and3
other principal-agent problems, an ongoing industry disequilibrium that makes executing and evaluating
bank mergers difficult, and accounting conventions idiosyncratic to the banking industry that cloud
performance measurement.
We offer a new explanation for these empirical findings.  We argue that mergers of large,
publicly traded commercial banks in the 1980s and 1990s were difficult to plan, execute, and value
because these mergers were in many ways a new phenomenon.  When regulatory restrictions on inter-
state banking and non-banking financial activities were rolled back in the 1980s and 1990s, M&As
became a vehicle for commercial banks to expand into new geographic markets and new financial
products such as brokerage, insurance, and investment banking.  But these acquiring banks had no best-
practices guidelines for planning and executing these increasingly large and complex acquisitions, and
capital markets had no experience evaluating these new kinds of deals.  Under such circumstances, it is
not surprising that many and perhaps most commercial bank M&As would perform poorly; nor is it
surprising that investors would have difficulty pricing bank M&As.
We also argue that these circumstances will eventually change, in large part due to information
spillover.  We hypothesize that commercial banks will learn how to better plan and execute M&As, not
necessarily or only by participating in repeated acquisitions themselves, but by observing the previous
mistakes and successes of other acquiring banks.  Note the distinction here between “learning-by-
observing” and “learning-by-doing.”  The former, which we study in this paper, is predicated on the
spillover of external information generated by other merging banks.  The latter, which we do not study in
this paper, is predicated on the generation of private, internal information via repeated acquisitions by the
same bank.  Similarly, we also hypothesize that investors will learn how to better evaluate bank mergers
by observing the successes and deficiencies of previous bank acquisitions.
If these information spillover hypotheses are correct, then the typical commercial bank merger of,
say, the mid-1990s or late-1990s would have been more likely to create value than the typical commercial
bank merger of the 1980s, because bank managers would have benefited from observing a larger number4
of previous commercial bank M&As in the new deregulated and technologically advanced banking
environment.  These information spillover hypotheses also suggest that the stock market would have been
a more accurate predictor of the long-run performance of commercial bank M&As announced during the
1990s than those announced during the 1980s.  Note that these patterns would be consistent with the
extant academic findings that the financial performance of the average bank merger announced during the
1980s and 1990s has been poor, and that the ability of the stock market to predict post-bank-merger
performance during the 1980s and 1990s has on average been poor.
We present four formal hypotheses: about value creation by bank M&As and how this value
creation is related to information spillover from previous bank M&As, and about stock market valuations
of bank M&As and how these valuations are related to information spillover from previous bank M&As.
We draw a distinction between “learning-by-doing” and “learning-by-observing.”  The former concept
has been thoroughly studied in the management literature and is driven by the internal experiences of
firms.  In contrast, the latter concept (upon which we focus here) is fueled by information generated
outside of the firm—for example, by the performance of recent M&As between other banks.  We test our
four hypotheses using data from 216 M&As between publicly traded commercial banking companies in
the U.S. between 1987 and 1999.  These empirical tests are based mainly on the inter-relationships among
three M&A-related variables: the abnormal stock market returns for the combined banks upon merger
announcement, the long-run change in the financial performance of the combined banks, and the volume
of other (unrelated) bank M&As in the years prior to the merger announcement.
We find strong and persistent evidence consistent with the notion that managers of merging banks
learn-by-observing previous bank mergers, and persistent albeit somewhat weaker evidence that market
investors learn-by-observing previous bank mergers.  Our results suggest that the value to bank managers
and market investors of the information present in previous mergers decays relatively quickly—
sometimes after just a single year—consistent with the rapid pace of change in bank regulation, banking
technologies, industry structure, and merger profile in the U.S. during our sample period.  These findings5
help explain why many academic studies have rejected the notion that bank M&As have created value.
More broadly, our findings imply that the stock market is a poor evaluator of phenomena that are
incompletely understood by market participants.  Note that if this “incomplete understanding” is
characterized as a deficiency in the stock of public information (which seems reasonable), then the
inability of investors to accurately price commercial bank M&As observed in previous studies becomes
quite consistent with the theory of semi-strong market efficiency.
I.  Experience Effects
Asher (1956), Arrow (1962), Alchian (1963), Hartley and Corcoran (1978) and others developed
the concept of experience effects to explain efficiency differences across British and U.S. airframe
manufacturers after the second world war.  The concept is typically expressed as follows: holding
production technology and firm size constant, as a firm accumulates experience using the technology, unit
costs will fall.  Experience is usually measured by accumulated production volume over time starting
from the initial unit produced, and experience effects are often characterized as “learning curves.”
Ghemawat (1985) collected information on 97 such learning curves from firms in various industries.  For
over 80 percent of the firms in his sample, a doubling of experience (that is, a 100% increase in
accumulated production between time s and time t) was associated with between a 10% to 25% decline in
unit costs.
While it seems intuitive that increased experience will improve outcomes, in some cases
experience can actually impede understanding, progress, and profits.  Merlo and Schottor (2001) construct
an experiment to test whether subjects learn better by doing or by observing, and find that “observers”
outperform “doers” in determining the unique Nash equilibrium in a multi-round tournament.  Doers
focus on each round individually, and receive either positive or negative reinforcement for the actions
they take, while observers have the luxury of considering potential payoffs from hypothetical decisions.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) model the influence of learning-by-doing on technological choice.  Agents6
who invest their human capital to learn a technology tend to be reluctant to switch technologies, even
when new technologies promise greater output.  In the realm of finance, Gervais and Odean (2001) model
how traders and investors overemphasize their successes and thereby become overconfident, and that this
overconfidence can lead to lower profits.  Griliches (1979) argues that measures of learning that are based
on accumulated experience over time can overstate a firm’s knowledge, because knowledge gained in the
past depreciates over time.
In addition to the knowledge they accumulate from their own activities, Griliches (1979) points
out that firms also accumulate knowledge via “information spillover” from the activities of competitors,
suppliers, customers, universities, and government.  In this study we characterize the experience gained
from spillover as “learning-by-observing” to distinguish this external experience channel from the more
familiar concept of learning-by-doing in which the creation and exploitation of new information is
internal to the firm.  For example, because investors are external to the firms they are attempting to value,
the stock market cannot learn-by-doing but can learn-by-observing private information that spills over
into the public sphere.  Pastor and Veronesi (2003) model the market’s valuation process in the presence
of learning about firm profitability.  Starting with the straightforward theoretical result that market-to-
book ratios are positively related to earnings uncertainty, they hypothesize that market-to-book ratios
should decline over firms’ lifetimes as information about the firms’ potential earnings streams becomes
more certain.  They find empirical support for these predictions, especially for young firms and for firms
that do not pay dividends.
There are numerous channels through which useful information can spill over from one firm or
industry to another firm or industry.  Consulting firms can be great clearinghouses for knowledge; Ofek
and Sarvary (2001) show that consulting firms leverage their knowledge from previous projects when
they embark on new projects.  In contrast, investment banks are probably a less important source for the
spillover of unbiased, value-relevant information; Rau (2000) finds investment bankers are more
interested in closing the deal than in creating mergers that perform well.  A less formal channel is “the7
industry buzz” which travels through trade publications (e.g., the American Banker), industry networks,
and professional/social circles.  Information can spill over via labor mobility, and in the longer term via
regulatory filings.  In the semiconductor industry there is evidence linking technology spillover to
engineers changing employers (Irwin and Klenow 1994) and also to patent filings (Almeida and Kogut
1997).  In the banking industry, the location of regional and headquarters offices in close proximity to
each other within large cities is likely to increase the frequency and speed of information spillover among
banks, clients, and personnel through both formal and informal channels.
1  Moreover, the recent
consolidation of the U.S. banking industry has likely intensified these information flows as managers
move from bank to bank as a result of merger-induced reassignments, buyouts, or overhead reductions.  If
anything, information spillover in the banking industry may be of higher quality than in other industries:
extensive quarterly regulatory filings provide an especially detailed source of financial and operating
information and may make it relatively easier for industry analysts to validate qualitative information
(i.e., “the buzz”) about commercial banking companies.
There has been little systematic investigation of experience effects at financial institutions.
Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992) argue that finance companies that entered niche markets (such as
leasing) earlier than their commercial bank competitors benefited from “dynamic scale economies in
information because of their early entry and accumulated experience.”  However, the authors did not
estimate the impact of this accumulated experience on costs or productivity (i.e., a learning curve).
DeYoung (2005) argues that newly chartered Internet banks may face two learning curves: an learning
curve related to the general banking experience accumulated as the new bank matures, and a technology-
specific learning curve related to the experience accumulated as the bank implements a new (Internet)
business model.  He finds strong evidence of the former but little evidence of the latter.
There is mixed evidence regarding experience effects at acquiring banks.  DeYoung (1997) finds
that mergers in which the acquiring bank has recent experience with acquisitions are more likely to
generate post-merger gains in cost efficiency.  Zhang (1997) finds that abnormal returns tend to increase8
with experience for banks making FDIC-assisted acquisitions of insolvent banks, but not for banks
making non-assisted acquisitions. Leshchinkskii and Zollo (2004) find that acquisition experience is
positively correlated to post-merger financial performance, but only for acquiring firms that carefully
codified their experiences in manuals and systems.  In contrast to these studies, Beitel, Schiereck, and
Wahrenburg (2002) find lower market returns upon announcement of bank acquisitions in which the
bidders were experienced acquirers.
II.  Bank M&A Performance
One of the puzzles in the empirical finance literature in recent years is the lack of systematic
evidence that bank M&As enhance firm value.  For example, in their review of the literature on bank
mergers and cost efficiency, Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1998) concluded that these studies “show
very little or no cost X-efficiency improvement...on the order of 5% or less (p.162).”  These were
surprising findings, because the geographic-expansion M&As of the 1980s and 1990s were widely
expected to generate scale economies and remove poorly run target banks from the industry.  Some
plausible explanations have been offered for these unexpected results: merger-induced cost reductions
were offset by the increased costs associated with changes in post-merger risk profiles and business
strategies (Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon 1999); cost savings were hidden
by accounting conventions (Kwan and Wilcox 1999); some bank mergers focused on revenue gains rather
than cost reductions (Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997); and some bank mergers were driven by
managerial hubris rather than efficiency motives (Bliss and Rosen 1999).
James and Wier (1987), Cornett and De (1991), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Becher (2000),
DeLong (2001), Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001), Rosen (2003) and others have studied the initial
market reaction to the announcement of bank mergers.  The following stylized facts have emerged from
these studies: abnormal returns to target firms are large and positive; abnormal returns to acquiring banks
are marginally negative; and combined abnormal returns are insignificant.  A handful of other studies9
found mixed evidence when testing whether abnormal market returns are good predictors of post-merger
financial performance.  For example, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) find a positive correlation between
initial market reaction to bank mergers and the long-run financial performance of the merged firms, but
Pilloff (1996) and Hart and Ipilado (2002) find no such evidence.
2  Other studies (e.g., DeLong 2003b)
have tested whether strategic bank mergers—that is, combinations of two banks with similar geographic
footprints or similar activity mixes—perform better than average in the long-run, but find little evidence.
Some observers have argued that the planning, implementation, and evaluation of bank mergers
during the 1980s and 1990s was unusually difficult because the banking industry was in disequilibrium
during this time period.  Flannery (1999) cautions that rapid and repeated changes in regulatory and
technological environments make it difficult for the market to gauge the value-creating effects of bank
mergers.  At the extreme, Pilloff and Santomero (1998) argue that in such an environment every bank
merger must be viewed as an idiosyncratic case.  This is consistent with Halpern (1983) who, early on in
the study of value creation by M&As, suggested that it is difficult to make generalizations about mergers.
Although this view implies that there has been little useful information spillover for bank mergers,
opportunities for learning-by-observing should be increasing as the industry disequilibrium dissipates and
regularities concerning successful bank mergers emerge.
III.  Hypotheses
We hypothesize that commercial banks have learned, by observing recent bank mergers, how to
better plan and execute mergers in an evolving, post-deregulation banking environment.  This broad
hypothesis is consistent with an academic literature that finds lackluster financial performance on average
for bank M&As over the past two decades.  It posits that bank mergers announced following periods of
relatively light bank M&A activity would be less likely to create value, while bank mergers announced
following periods of relatively heavy bank M&A activity would be more likely to create value.  We also
hypothesize that the stock market has learned, by observing recent bank mergers, how to better identify10
value-enhancing bank mergers.  This broad hypothesis is consistent with extant academic evidence that
investors have been unable to accurately value bank M&As over the past two decades on average.  It
posits that market valuations would be especially poor for bank mergers announced following periods of
relatively light bank M&A activity, and would be relatively more accurate for bank mergers announced
following periods of relatively heavy bank M&A activity.
We formalize these two broad hypotheses into four explicit, empirically testable hypotheses.  The
first of these is called the “efficient mergers” hypothesis:
H1:  Bank mergers improve the long-run financial performance of the combined banks.
As discussed above, this hypothesis does not receive systematic support in the existing bank merger
literature.  We test H1 here to see if we can replicate the general findings of the previous literature using
our merger data set, and to establish a focal point for the hypothesis tests that follow. The second
hypothesis is an inter-temporal variant of H1, and is called the “bank learning-by-observing” hypothesis:
H2:  Bank mergers are more likely to improve the long-run performance of the combined
banks if a substantial number of other banks have merged in the recent past.
Implicit in H2 is the proposition that bank managers learn by observing the experiences of recent bank
mergers via information spillover, and this information makes them more likely to repeat the successes,
and less likely to repeat the mistakes, of those mergers.
Even if the average bank merger does not create value in the long-run, an efficient stock market
should be able to identify which bank mergers will perform relatively well or relatively poorly.  The third
hypothesis concerns the ability of the stock market to correctly value bank mergers, and is called the
“efficient markets” hypothesis:
H3:  The stock market is able to identify value-enhancing mergers upon their
announcement.11
As discussed above, there is little empirical support for this hypothesis in the extant bank merger
literature.  We test H3 here to see if we can replicate the general findings of the previous literature using
our merger data set, and to establish a focal point for our final hypothesis test, which is called the “market
learning-by-observing” hypothesis:
H4:  The stock market will be better able to identify value-enhancing bank mergers if a
substantial number of other banks have merged in the recent past.
Implicit in H4 is the proposition that investors learn by observing the post-merger successes and failures
of recent bank mergers, resulting in merger valuations that are more likely to reflect the long-run financial
performance of the combined banks.  Also implicit in H4 is the presumption that the stock market is semi-
strong efficient—that is, the spillover of private information from previous mergers adds to the stock of
public information, and thereby facilitates more correct valuations of current mergers.
IV.  Bank Merger Data Set
We test these four hypotheses for 216 mergers and acquisitions of publicly traded U.S.
commercial banking companies that were announced and completed between 1987 and 1999.  Although
thousands of U.S. commercial banks merged or were acquired during the 1980s and 1990s, only a small
percentage of those mergers combined two publicly traded banking companies.  We constructed an initial
data set of 616 mergers that were announced and completed between publicly-traded banking companies
between 1987 and 1999.  These mergers were identified from the Thomson Financial Securities Data
(formally Securities Data Company, or SDC) database.
3  From this initial sample, 206 mergers were
excluded because stock return data for either the acquiring firm (11 mergers) and/or the target firm (195
mergers) were not available in the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) database.  We excluded 65
more mergers because stock market data were incomplete for either the acquirer (14 mergers) or the target
(51 mergers).  An additional 128 mergers were excluded from our sample for a variety of reasons: either12
the acquiring or target firm was not a commercial bank or bank holding company (35 mergers), we could
not observe one full calendar year of pre-merger accounting data for both merger partners (23 mergers),
we could not observe three full calendar years of post-merger accounting data for the merged bank (67
mergers) often because an acquirer became a target itself (33 mergers), or the target firm was a failing
bank (3 mergers).  The 216 deals in our final data set are listed in order of announcement date in the
appendix to this paper.
Table I displays some descriptive information for our merger data set.  Accounting data for
acquiring banks and target banks comes from the Y-9C Reports that bank holding companies submit to
the Federal Reserve, or from the Call Reports that banks submit to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation for the handful of banking companies in our data that are not organized as holding
companies.  The number of mergers per year, the size of the acquirer, and the size of the target all exhibit
increasing trends over time.  These data reflect the evolving industry conditions during our sample
period—in particular, an industry-wide focus on recapitalization rather than growth during the poor
banking environment early in the sample period, and the fruits of industry deregulation that permitted
banking companies to grow in size and geographic scope later in the sample period.  There are no
discernable trends in the percentage of mergers with strategic geographic focus (proxied by the degree to
which the deposit markets of the acquiring and target banks substantially overlap) or strategic activity
focus (proxied by the degree to which the stock returns of the acquiring and target banks are positively
correlated).
4
V.  Measuring stock market valuation
We use an event study methodology to measure the initial stock market reaction to each of the
216 merger announcements.  A daily market model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression techniques:13
Ri,t  =  αi  +  βi*Rm,t  +  εi,t                                                           (1)
where Rm,t is the daily return on the Datastream Index for U.S. Banks, i = (1,216) indexes the mergers,
and t = (-300, -50) indexes days prior to the merger announcement.  The dependent variable Ri,t is either
the daily market return on the acquiring bank (R
A
i,t), the daily market return on the target bank (R
T
i,t), or
the daily return on the combined market values of the acquiring and target banks (R
P
i,t), all of which were
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banks on day t.  As demonstrated by DeLong (2001), constructing pro forma combined returns in this
fashion is more accurate than the typical procedure which uses asset-weighted or equity-weighted
averages of the acquirer and target returns (e.g., Houston and Ryngaert 1994).  The cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) around the event date are calculated by summing the estimated daily abnormal returns
from ten days before the merger announcement to one day after the announcement:
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We also estimated the acquirer, target, and combined CARs using three alternative event windows (-5
days to +5 days, -10 days to +10 days, and –10 days to +5 days).
Table II displays summary statistics for acquirer, target, and combined CARs.  Consistent with the
large body of merger literature that precedes us, the merger announcements simply redistributed wealth14
from acquirer shareholders (statistically significant CARs ranging from –2.39% to –3.16%) to target
shareholders (statistically significant CARs ranging from 13.92% to 16.43%) in the short run with no
creation of new shareholder wealth (statistically non-significant combined CARs).  The results are robust
across the four different event window definitions, and as such we will use the –10 day to +1 day CAR
values throughout the remainder of this study.  Table III reports chronological subsample averages for
these CARs for the first 108 mergers (in column b) and the second 108 mergers (in column c) in our data.
These averages suggest that bank mergers remained purely redistributional over time and did not create
value on average.  We tested this more formally by regressing combined, acquirer, and target CARs on an
intercept and a linear time variable.  These estimated regression lines are super-imposed on the CAR
scatter diagrams in Figures 1, 2, and 3.  None of these time trends has a statistically significant slope
coefficient.  Overall, the market reaction to bank M&As became neither more favorable nor less favorable
over the course of our 1987-1999 sample period.
VI.  Measuring post-merger financial performance
We measure the long-run change in financial performance, ∆post-merger performance, for the
merging banks in seven dimensions of performance: ROA (return-on-assets), ROE (return-on-equity),
Interest Margin (net interest income-to-assets), Cost Efficiency (noninterest expense-to-operating
income), Loans-to-Assets, Core Deposits-to-Assets, and Noninterest Income Ratio (noninterest income-
to-operating income).  As described below, ∆post-merger performance is based on industry-adjusted data:
it measures the pre-merger (one year prior) to post-merger (three years after) change in the financial ratios
of the merging banks after first normalizing those financial ratios to average industry-wide levels in those
years.  This approach largely inoculates ∆post-merger performance from inter-temporal changes in
recorded financial performance caused by industry-wide phenomena or economy-wide phenomena that
systematically affect the banking industry.15
There are three compelling reasons to measure long-run post-merger performance based on
accounting ratios rather than market returns.  First, accounting ratios capture actual financial performance
over a period of time, while market returns are forward-looking measures of expected earnings.  Second,
accounting ratios allow us to analyze important components of financial performance (e.g., cost efficiency
or core deposit funding) in addition to overall financial performance (e.g., ROA and ROE).  Third, on eof
our goals is to test conjectures about the stock market’s ability to predict future financial performance
(hypotheses H3 and H4); to this end, using short-run market returns (CARs, which measure investor
expectations based on current information) to predict long-run buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs, which
compare investor expectations based on different information sets at two different points in time) simply
comes up short.
We follow a four-step process to calculate ∆post-merger performance.  First, we observe the
financial statements of the acquiring and target banks at the end of the calendar year preceding the merger
announcement date, combine these statements to create pro forma financial statements for a hypothetical
combined bank, and calculate hypothetical pre-merger financial ratios for the pro forma combined bank.
Second, we calculate post-merger financial ratios for the actual combined banks using financial
statements three full calendar years after the merger announcement date.  Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and
Udell (1998) argue persuasively that it takes three years for merged banks to achieve the bulk of the
merger-induced changes in financial and operational performance.  Third, we normalize both the pre-
merger and post-merger financial ratios by subtracting off the same-year, industry-average financial
ratios.
5  Fourth, we take the difference between the normalized pre-merger financial ratios and the
normalized post-merger financial ratios.  Table IV displays sample and subsample averages for ∆post-
merger performance for the seven different performance dimensions.
Column (a) in Table IV provides our basic test of Hypothesis 1 (efficient mergers).  Consistent
with the previous literature on bank merger performance, overall post-merger financial performance as
measured by ROA and ROE does not improve on average, and ROA actually declines by a small but16
statistically significant amount.  Post-merger Noninterest Income Ratio also declines on average, although
this is not necessarily an indication of poor financial performance: DeYoung and Rice (2004) conclude
that well-managed banks focus more closely on traditional intermediation-based activities such as
lending, and expand more slowly into noninterest activities than their less well-managed peers.  Neither
Cost Efficiency nor the Interest Margin improve post-merger; the former result is interesting given that
cutting duplicative and wasteful overhead costs was the primary stated motive for many of these bank
mergers.  There is a substantial increase (equal to about 5 percent of assets) in Loans-to-Assets.  While
this increase may or may not indicate improved asset allocation (i.e., loans-to-assets can be too high,
depending on the risk-return profile of the marginal loan and the cost and stability of loan funding), it is
consistent with Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey’s (1997) conclusion that revenue efficiency increased
with bank megamergers during the 1990s chiefly due to post-merger shifts in acquired banks’ assets from
securities to loans.  There is also a substantial improvement (equal to about 2½ percent of assets) in Core
Deposits-to-Assets.  Core deposits (defined here as deposits in transactions accounts and non-brokered
time deposits less than $100,000) represent a relatively inexpensive and stable funding source, and are
held by customers likely to purchase additional products from the bank.  This is somewhat of a surprise,
given the well-documented depositor run-offs following the First Union-CoreStates merger, the Bank of
America-Security Pacific merger, and other large bank mergers during the 1990s.
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Columns (b) and (c) in Table IV display subsample averages for the first half and second half of
the mergers.  These data suggest that, as time passed during the sample period, banks got better at
achieving post-merger financial performance gains.  Post-merger performance was statistically better in
the second half of the sample in terms of ROA, ROE, Cost Efficiency, and Core Deposits-to-Assets.
Figures 4 through 10 plot each of the long-run financial performance measures against time, and include a
linear OLS trend line.  The trend lines are statistically positive for ROA, ROE, and Core Deposits-to-
Assets and statistically negative for Cost Efficiency, all of which indicate that bank merger performance
improved over time.  As discussed above, the statistically negative change in Noninterest Income Ratio17
over time may also indicate improving merger performance over time as well.  Although many of these
results are consistent with the learning-based explanation of merger performance posited in Hypothesis 2
(bank learning-by-observing), these are uncontrolled tests and thus cannot rule out other explanations.
VII.  Regression frameworks
We test the remainder of our hypotheses using multivariate regression techniques.  Equation (4)
provides our test of Hypothesis 2 (bank learning-by-observing):
∆post-merger performancei  =  a  +  b·LBYOi  +  c·timei  +  d·LBYOi·timei  +  f·controlsi  +  ei    (4)
where the dependent variable ∆post-merger performance is the change in industry-adjusted accounting
performance (e.g., ROA, ROE, cost efficiency) for merger i (i=1,216) during the three years following the
merger, as described above.  The residual term e captures the unexplained variance in ∆post-merger
performance and is assumed to be randomly distributed around zero for merger i and unrelated to the
other right-hand-side terms.  The variables in the controls vector are described in detail below.  The two
main right-hand-side variables are LBYO and time.
LBYO is our proxy for learning-by-observing, or more exactly, observable information spilling
over from previous bank mergers from which bank managers and bank investors can potentially learn.  As
we discuss more fully below, LBYO can be thought of as an information-state variable.  We calculate
LBYO a number of different ways.  Our base definition is LBYO(3) which is equal to the cumulative
number of mergers involving either traded or non-traded commercial banking companies in the U.S.
during the 1,095 days (three years) prior to the merger in question.  This presumes that it takes three years
for bank managers and investors to fully validate the information that spills over from previous bank
mergers; while this is a somewhat arbitrary choice, it is consistent with the conventions used in many of
the bank merger studies discussed above (e.g., Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998).18
We augment our base definition LBYO(3) with three alternative definitions.  First, we re-calculate
LBYO(3) using different pre-merger learning-by-observing windows—as short as one year and as long as
seven years—resulting in the following set of alternative measures: LBYO(1),  LBYO(2),  LBYO(4),
LBYO(5), LBYO(6), and LBYO(7).  Second, we construct a full set of LBYO variables based on non-
cumulative learning-by-observing windows.  LBYO(y1), LBYO(y2), ..., LBYO(y7) measure, respectively,
the number of mergers that occurred within the year prior to the merger in question (1 to 365 days);
within the second year prior to the merger in question (366 to 730 days), etc.  Finally, we construct a
weighted version of LBYO that includes the number of bank mergers observed in each of the previous
seven years, with the more recent years receiving heavier weights based on a logistic distribution.  The
resulting variable, weighted_LBYO, accounts for the possibility that information observed further in the
past degrades, either because it becomes less relevant to current circumstances or because it is forgotten.
Figure 11 plots LBYO(1), LBYO(3), and weighted_LBYO against time for each of the 216 M&As in our
data set, and illustrates that the information state represented by these variables does not increase
monotonically during our sample period, but rather has several high and low points.
The variable time measures elapsed calendar time in years starting at the beginning of our sample
period (time=1 for mergers announced in 1987; time=2 for mergers announced in 1988; etc.).  We include
time to separate general effects associated with the passage of time (e.g., regulatory change, technological
progress) from the information spillover and learning effects more specific to bank mergers (LBYO).  As
seen above in Table 4 as well as in Figures 4-10, our ∆post-merger performance measures exhibit
systematic increases and decreases over time, and by including time we hope to neutralize these general
inter-temporal effects.  Because these effects are unlikely to be linear, we also estimate alternative
regressions in which time is replaced by a series of four technology trend variables—cell phones per
capita, computers per capita, ATM transactions per capita, and cashless transactions per capita—all of
which increase non-linearly over time, and hence may prove to be more flexible proxies for general time
effects.  Moreover, because these technology variables reflect changes in the speed at which information19
travels, the efficiency with which information can be processed, and the manner in which banks produce
financial services, they are likely to be related to the changing capabilities of bank managers and investors
to plan, implement, and evaluate M&As.
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Hypothesis 2 (bank learning-by-observing) predicts a positive relationship between LBYO and
∆post-merger performance, i.e., a merger will tend to perform better as information spillover from recent
mergers increases.  We include the interaction term LBYO*time to account for the possibility that learning
from information spillover may accelerate over time, or that the benefits from information spillover may
diminish over time.  Thus, any combination of b>0 and d0 in equation (4) would be consistent with
bank learning-by-observing.
Equation (5) provides our tests of Hypothesis 3 (efficient markets) and Hypothesis 4 (market
learning-by-observing):
CARi  =  a  +  b·∆post-merger performancei  +  c·LBYOi
     +  d·∆post-merger performancei ·LBYOi  +  f·controlsi  +  ei                (5)
where as described above the dependent variable CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the combined
banks around the merger announcement date.  Although the dependent variable CAR pre-dates the
independent variable ∆post-merger performance, this specification is a natural way to test our hypotheses
about merger pricing and information spillover.  In a full information (strong efficient markets) world
investors will know upon announcement how a merger will impact the financial performance of the
merging firms (i.e., ∆ROA,  ∆ROE,  ∆Interest Margin, ∆Cost Efficiency, ∆Loans-to-Assets,  ∆Core
Deposits-to-Assets, and ∆Noninterest Income Ratio) and will price the merger accordingly based on this
knowledge.  Thus, causation will run from ∆post-merger performance to CAR, where our measures of
∆post-merger performance are noisy proxies for actual investor knowledge upon merger announcement.20
These measures are “noisy proxies” because we only get to observe them after three years, by which time
unpredictable events may have enhanced or worsened actual merger performance.  In a partial
information (semi-strong efficient markets) world this causation will be somewhat weaker: in addition to
being noisy, the ex post realizations of ∆post-merger performance also reflect merger-specific
information that investors did not know at the time of the merger and hence could not have accurately
priced.  Thus, we are testing whether the strength of the causation running from ∆post-merger
performance to CAR is at least partially explained by changes in the information-state variable LBYO.
Hypothesis 3 (efficient markets) predicts a positive relationship between CAR and ∆post-merger
performance with no role for the information-state variable LBYO.  If the stock market is efficient and
investors are fully informed about the phenomenon they are pricing (strong efficient markets), then
investors will be able to accurately price a new merger regardless of the amount of information spilling
over from other recent mergers.  Thus, we would expect b>0, c=0, and d=0 in equation (5).  The volume
of and/or experiences conveyed from other recent mergers has no impact on investors’ information state
under this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (market learning-by-observing) predicts that the relationship between CAR and
∆post-merger performance will grow increasingly positive with increases in the information-state
variable LBYO.  If the stock market is efficient but investors lack full information about the phenomenon
they are pricing (semi-strong efficient markets), then investors will be better able to price a new merger
when there is relevant information spilling over from other recent mergers.  Thus, we would expect d>0
as investor valuations more closely reflect actual merger value in high-information states.  The
implications of this hypothesis for coefficients b and c are less direct.  Because risk-averse investors
should be willing, ceteris paribus, to pay higher prices in high-information states (due to reduced
uncertainty), we may observe a positive relationship between CAR and LBYO even in the absence of
improved post-merger performance (c≥0).  The expected sign for coefficient b is ambiguous.  If investor21
information is only somewhat incomplete, then we may still observe a positive relationship between CAR
and  ∆post-merger performance even in the absence of information spillover (b≥0).  But if investor
information is substantially incomplete and there is a substantial amount of uncertainty—a distinct
possibility for combinations of unrelated firms in a newly deregulated industry environment—then
investors might interpret increased profitability as a signal of increased risk, resulting in a negative
relationship between CAR and ∆post-merger performance (b<0).  Thus, any combination of b0, c≥0,
and d>0 would be consistent with the market learning-by-observing hypothesis.
A.  Control variables
We include a vector of controls on the right-hand-side of equations (4) and (5) to help explain the
variation in the dependent variables not related to our main hypothesis tests.  Our control variables
include the following:
•  Target equity-to-assets.  Post-merger financial performance will likely be hampered when the target
bank has depleted levels of capital.  Large numbers of banks became insolvent during the first part of
our sample period (roughly 1987-1993), and although we exclude failing-target mergers from our
data, target bank capital levels ranged as low as 2.35% in our data.  Because banking conditions
improved greatly during the course of our sample period, we also interact this variable with time.
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•  Activity focus.  Post-merger performance gains may be more likely when the target and acquiring
banks have similar pre-merger business strategies (DeLong 2003b; Altunbas and Ibánez 2005).  To
measure business strategy similarities, we calculated the correlation between the pre-merger stock
returns of the target and acquiring banks (Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishney 1990).  Activity focus is a
dummy variable equal to one for mergers in which this correlation was above the sample median.  In
alternative specifications, we replaced this dummy variable with the raw correlation on which it is
based, with no material changes in the results.22
•  Geographic focus.  Post-merger performance gains may be more likely when the target and acquiring
banks have overlapping geographic footprints.  To measure geographic overlap, we calculated the
percentage of combined-bank deposits drawn from MSAs in which both the target and acquiring
banks operated prior to the merger.  Geographic focus is a dummy variable equal to one for mergers
in which this measure was above the sample median.  In alternative specifications, we replaced this
dummy variable with the raw market overlap on which it is based, with no material changes in the
results.
•  Learning-by-doing (LBYD).  We include a learning-by-doing variable to separate the potential effects
of passive learning-by-observing from the potential effects of active, internal learning-by-doing.  We
define LBYD as the number of other bank acquisitions made during the previous 1,095 days (three
years) by the acquiring bank.
•  Post-merger growth.  Post-merger financial gains may be less likely when the acquiring bank is
growing rapidly (either via internal growth or by making additional acquisitions), which can divert
management’s attention from integrating the target bank into its new organization.  Post-merger
growth is the percentage growth rate of post-merger bank assets divided by the percentage growth
rate of total industry assets over the three years following the merger.  To reduce the influence of
large outlying values we truncated post-merger growth at -30 and +30, which affected about 5% our
observations.
•  log acquirer assets.  Post-merger financial performance may be affected by the size of the acquiring
bank.  For example, large acquiring banks may have already achieved scale-based improvements in
operating costs and portfolio diversification prior to the acquisition.  log acquirer assets is the natural
log of the acquiring bank’s total assets prior to the merger.
•  Equal size.  Post-merger performance gains may be less likely in so-called ‘mergers of equals’ in
which control of the post-merger bank is in question.  Equal size is a constructed variable that ranges23
continuously from near zero for disparate-sized targets and acquirers, to one for equal-sized targets
and acquirers (DeYoung 1997).
•  Megamerger.  Post-merger financial performance may be different in so-called ‘megamergers’ in
which both the target and acquiring banks are large (Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997).
Megamerger is a dummy variable equal to one for mergers in which both the target and acquiring
banks have more than $1 billion in assets.
•  CEO tenure and CEO stock.  Post-merger financial gains may be less likely when acquiring bank
managers are entrenched (Bliss and Rosen 1999).  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO of the
acquiring bank has held that position, and CEO stock is the percentage of acquiring bank shares held
by the CEO.  Values were missing for  CEO tenure and CEO stock for a small number of mergers.
We substituted the sample median values in these cases.
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•  Percent stock.  Post-merger performance could be related to whether the acquirer paid for the target
with stock or cash.  Myers and Majluf (1984) and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) argue that
an acquirer will pay for a merger with stock when the acquirer knows its stock is overvalued.
Investors, realizing this strategy, drive down the price of the acquirer’s stock.  Percent stock is the
percentage of payment the acquirer makes in stock.
•  Pooling.  Accounting measures of post-merger performance could reflect the type of accounting
the acquirer uses to incorporate the target into its books.  The pooling method superimposes the
target’s balance sheet upon the acquirer’s balance sheet.  The purchase method treats the target like
any capital good, and differences between the purchase price and the target’s market value must be
amortized.  Acquirers usually prefer the pooling method since fewer expenses occur to depress future
earnings.  (See DeLong 2003a for a discussion of the two methods.)  Pooling is a dummy variable
equal to one for mergers that use the pooling method.24
•  Hostile.  The attitude of the target’s management at the time of the merger could influence post-
merger performance.  Hostile takeovers could create more value than friendly ones, because hostile
takeovers may be able to get rid of poor managers more easily than friendly takeovers (Jensen and
Ruback 1983).  On the other hand, hostile takeovers could create animosity among the employees of
the merging partners, thereby hindering post-merger performance.  Hostile is a dummy variable equal
to one for unfriendly takeovers.  Hostile takeovers are rare in the banking industry – only 3 of the 216
M&As in our data were hostile.
•  Hot market.  Post-merger financial performance may be related to so-called ‘hot markets,’ periods of
time when investors respond especially positively to bank merger announcements.  During a hot
market, management may be more likely to make acquisitions that would not be acceptable to
investors in less optimistic market environments (Rosen 2003).  Hot market is equal to the average
CAR for the previous five mergers in our data.  For the first five mergers in our data, we set hot
market equal to the mean value of CAR.
•  State M&As and ∆HHI.  Post-merger financial performance may be related to the regulatory and
competitive environments faced by the merging banks.  State M&As is the percentage of all banks
that were acquired in the target bank’s home state during the year of the merger, and is included to
capture (inversely) state-level regulatory barriers to entry and expansion by merger.  ∆HHI is the
change in the Herfindahl index (weighted by the deposit shares of the acquiring and target banks)
caused by the merger, and is included to capture the increase in potential market power due to the
merger.
•  GDP  growth.  Merging banks may perform better-than-average during certain phases of the business
cycle due to cyclical variation in interest rates, the supply of deposit funding, the demand for financial
services, inter-bank competition, etc.  To partially control for these phenomena we include GDP25
growth, the percent change in U.S. gross domestic product during the year in which the merger was
announced.
Summary statistics for all of the dependent and independent variables used our the regression tests are
provided in Table V.
VIII.  Results for bank learning-by-observing
Table VI displays the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (4).  The
estimated coefficients on LBYO(3) and LBYO(3)*time provide the tests of Hypothesis 2 (bank learning-
by-observing).  We find evidence consistent with bank learning-by-observing in four of the seven
regressions.  The coefficient on LBYO(3) is statistically positive and the coefficient on LBYO(3)*time is
statistically negative in the ∆ROA, ∆ROE, and ∆Interest Margin regressions.  These coefficients are also
statistically significant in the ∆Efficiency Ratio regressions, albeit as expected with the opposite signs.
The implied improvements in financial performance tend to be economically significant as well.  A ten
percent increase in LBYO(3) evaluated at the sample means generates an estimated 0.0004 increase in
∆ROA; using the average pre-merger acquiring bank ROA of 0.0108 as a benchmark, this corresponds to
a substantial 3.7% improvement in post-merger profitability.  Similarly, a ten percent increase in LBYO(3)
is associated with a 2.3% increase in ROE, a 1.3% increase in Interest Margin, and a 1.5% improvement
in Efficiency Ratio.
10  Thus, our findings imply non-trivial information spillover-related improvements in
post-merger bank performance.
The estimated coefficients on LBYO(3) are approximately 9 to 11 times the size of the estimated
coefficients on LBYO(3)*time, which indicates robust bank learning-by-observing early in the sample
period that gradually diminished over time.  The bottom panel of Table VI shows the estimated
derivatives of ∆post-merger performance with respect to LBYO(3), evaluated for each value of time (1
through 13).  The derivatives for ∆ROA,  ∆ROE,  ∆Interest Margin, and ∆Efficiency Ratio remain26
statistically different from zero for time ≤ 6, implying that the existence of bank learning-by-observing in
these performance dimensions had run its course (on average) by the mid-1990s.  The ∆Noninterest
Income derivatives are an exception to this pattern, and do not become statistically negative until time ≥
10.  This time lag implies that bank learning-by-observing regarding noninterest-based activities occurred
late in the sample period, with a negative sign that is consistent with recent findings that risk-adjusted
returns from nontraditional fee-based activities (e.g., investment banking, securities brokerage, insurance)
may be less favorable than was initially expected by commercial banks (DeYoung and Rice 2004).
Tables VII and VIII provide robustness tests for the specification of time and LBYO.  Table VII
displays selected coefficient estimates from specifications of equation (4) in which the linear time trend
variable is replaced by the non-linear per capita technology time trends for cell phones, computers, ATM
transactions, and cashless transactions.  The results are robust to the base case from Table VI, and
continue to offer strong support for Hypothesis 2 in the ∆ROA, ∆ROE, ∆Interest Margin, and ∆Efficiency
Ratio regressions.
Table VIII displays selected coefficient estimates from specifications of equation (4) in which the
base case LBYO(3) variable is replaced by alternative definitions for the information-state variable.  In
Panel 1 the information set is assumed to include mergers from the previous seven years, with mergers in
more recent years weighted more heavily.  These tests generate robust results in support of Hypothesis 2
for ∆ROA, ∆ROE, ∆Interest Margin, and ∆Efficiency Ratio, and in addition they provide support of bank
learning-by-observing for ∆Core Deposits-to-Assets.  In Panel 2 the (unweighted) information sets are
assumed to include mergers over various times periods prior to the merger; moreover, the value-relevance
of information from previous mergers is sometimes assumed to degrade quickly (e.g., LBYO(1)) and is
sometimes assumed to be long-lasting (e.g., LBYO(7)).  The results suggest that information value
degrades most quickly in the ∆Loans-to-Assets regressions, which provide support for Hypothesis 2 only
when the information set is limited to mergers occurring within the past year (LBYO(1)).  In contrast,27
information has quite long-lasting value in the ∆ROA, ∆ROE, and ∆Efficiency Ratio regressions, where
information sets as short as one year (LBYO(1)) and as long as six years (LBYO(6)) provide support for
Hypothesis 2.
In some areas of financial performance only information from older mergers appears to be useful.
For example, the coefficients on LBYO(4) through LBYO(7) in Panel 2 provide support for Hypothesis 2
in the ∆Core Deposits-to-Assets regressions, and the coefficients on LBYO(4) through LBYO(6) provide
support for Hypothesis 2 in the ∆Interest Margin regressions.  These results are consistent with the post-
merger depositor run-off phenomena discussed above: if it took previous merging banks several years to
figure out how to attract inexpensive core deposits back to the bank, then any lessons learned from
observing those previous mergers would be delayed as well.  The results from the ∆Noninterest Income
Ratio regressions also are consistent with delayed learning—in this case, the sign of the learning-by-
observing coefficient switches from positive to negative as the information set includes older mergers.
The results shown in Table IX suggest that previous mergers do not generate a continuous stream
of observable useful information, but rather generate useful information at two separate junctures: during
the initial post-merger year, and then again about three years later.  The table displays the results obtained
from re-estimating the Table VIII, Panel 2 regressions after replacing the cumulative learning-by-
observing variables LBYO(1) through LBYO(7) with the non-cumulative (individual year) learning-by-
observing variables LBYO(y1) through LBYO(y7).  The coefficient on LBYO(y1) is statistically significant
for six of the seven performance measures (all but ∆Core Deposits-to-Assets), which implies that
previous mergers generate useful information relatively quickly and this information can be observed and
implemented by other merging banks.  The results also imply that previous mergers yield a second round
of useful, observable information after about three-to-four years.  The coefficients on LBYO(y3) and/or
LBYO(y4) are statistically significant for ∆Interest Margin, ∆Efficiency Ratio, ∆Loans-to-Assets, and
∆Noninterest Income Ratio.  These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that it takes three
years for merged banks to achieve the bulk of the merger-induced changes in financial and operational28
performance (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998).  Note that this second round of information is
not associated with statistically significant increases in profitability—the (non-risk adjusted) profit
enhancements from wider interest margins, improved cost efficiency, and increased loans-to-assets were
apparently offset by reductions in noninterest income.  As above, the evidence here implies that for some
areas of financial performance previous mergers only slowly generate useful information (e.g., core
deposit funding, noninterest income).
Returning to the Table VI regressions, a number of the control variables have statistically
significant and economically sensible coefficients.  M&As in which the combined banks share the same
geographic market (geographic focus, ∆HHI), acquiring banks that make additional acquisitions in the
years following the merger (post-merger growth), and M&As in which the acquiring bank was large (log
acquirer assets) all tend to make smaller post-merger improvements in financial performance.  In
contrast, M&As in which both banks were relatively large (megamergers) tended to make larger post-
merger improvements.  Acquiring banks led by CEOs with large ownership stakes (CEO stock) tended to
make post-merger progress in intermediation activities (∆Loans-to-Assets,  ∆Interest Margin), while
acquiring banks led by CEOs with long job tenure (CEO tenure) were better able to hold on to core
depositor relationships post-merger.  The estimated derivatives with respect to target equity-to-assets
(evaluated at the mean value of time) imply that post-merger performance improvements are more likely
when the acquired bank has been poorly run or suffered from bad luck in the recent past. M&As
announced during economic expansions (GDP growth) were less likely to improve post-merger interest
margins and more likely to lose core depositors—these results are consistent with pro-cyclical narrowing
of interest margins due to increases in short-term rates, increases in deposit demand, and increased inter-
bank competition for lending opportunities.
It is worth emphasizing that the coefficient on LBYD, the learning-by-doing variable, is
statistically significant only in the ∆Loans-to-Assets regressions.  So while the data strongly support the
possibility that banks benefit by observing other previous mergers, we find relatively little evidence here29
to suggest that banks learn from their own previous mergers.  This counter-intuitive finding in all
likelihood reflects the fact that the banks in the best position to learn-by-doing—that is, banks that
perform a lot of mergers—have noisy financial statements because they are perpetually digesting other
banks, which makes it difficult to measure improved financial performance for any single merger in our
empirical framework.
IX.  Results for market learning-by-observing
Table X displays the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (5).  The
estimated derivative with respect to ∆post-merger performance (displayed near the bottom of the table
along with its p-value) provides a test of Hypothesis 3 (efficient markets) and the estimated coefficient on
the interaction term LBYO(3)*∆post-merger performance provides the test of Hypothesis 4 (market
learning-by-observing).
We find very little evidence consistent with Hypothesis 3.  The estimated derivative
∂CAR/∂∆post-merger performance is statistically significant only when post-merger performance is
measured by ∆Core Deposits-to-Assets.  Evidently, market investors were able to distinguish ex ante
between bank mergers that had favorable versus unfavorable impacts on core deposit funding, but on
average were not able to assess the impact of bank mergers on other dimensions of financial performance.
The fact that this derivative test yields statistically non-significant results in the first two columns on
Table X—where ∆post-merger performance is defined by the broad profitability measures ∆ROA and
∆ROE—suggests that market investors were not on average able to efficiently price bank mergers during
our 1987-1999 sample period.
In contrast, we find relatively broad evidence consistent with Hypothesis 4 that market investors
learn-by-observing.  The positive coefficients on the interaction terms in the first two columns of Table X
indicate that the correlations between CAR and ∆ROA and between CAR and ∆ROE are more positive for30
mergers that occur during high information states.  For example, in the average information state
indicated by the median value of LBYO(3) = 0.7030, a one-standard deviation increase in ∆ROA is
associated with a trivial change in CAR of −0.0007 (only about 7/100ths of a percentage point).
11  But in
the relatively high information state indicated by the 75
th percentile value of LBYO(3) = 0.9895, a one-
standard deviation increase in ∆ROA is associated with an economically meaningful increase in CAR of
+0.0072 (about 7/10ths of a percentage point).  We obtain similar results using the regression results in
the second column of Table X: in the relatively high 75
th percentile information state, a one-standard
deviation increase in ∆ROE is associated with an economically meaningful increase in CAR of +0.0033
(about 3/10ths of a percentage point).  The interaction term LBYO(3)*∆post-merger performance is not
statistically significant in the remaining five columns of Table X—thus, not surprisingly, our results on
average indicate that an informed market prices mergers according to their impact on overall profitability
(∆ROA, ∆ROE) rather than their impact on the various components of profitability, some of which may
be important in some mergers but relatively unimportant in other mergers.
A handful of the control variables bear statistically significant coefficients in these regressions.
All else equal, market investors paid less for mergers of equals, a rational response given the anecdotal
evidence that these mergers undergo difficult post-merger transitions.  Ironically, investors paid less
during “hot markets”—this likely indicates that bank merger pricing occurs in waves, so that mergers
occurring near the end of, or just after, a so-called “hot market” (by our definition) period have lower than
average prices.  Consistent with the equation (4) results, investors paid less during economic expansions.
Finally, investors paid more for hostile takeovers, although this result should be discounted given the
small number (three) of hostile takeovers in our data.
For robustness, we re-estimated the equation (5) tests using alternative definitions for the
information-state variable LBYO.  The results are displayed in Table XI.  In the first panel the LBYO
variable is excluded entirely; this specification provides a simplified test of Hypothesis 3 (efficient
markets).  Again, we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis only for ∆Core Deposits-to-Assets.31
The remaining four panels define the information state using, respectively, LBYO(1), LBYO(2), LBYO(3),
and weighted LBYO.  As above, these regressions yield evidence consistent with Hypothesis 4 (market
learning-by-observing) for the broad ∆ROA and ∆ROE performance measures, as well as some weak
evidence in support of this hypothesis for the ∆Efficiency Ratio performance measure.  Finally, the results
here suggest that recent mergers contain relatively more valuable information for investors as well as for
bank managers: the coefficient magnitudes for the interaction variables LBYO*∆post-merger performance
decline systematically as we include older information in the information-state variable.
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X.  Conclusions
In this study we examine the long-run financial performance of 216 M&As of publicly-traded
U.S. banking companies announced and completed between 1987 and 1999, as well as the ability of the
stock market to predict this long-run performance.  On average, these data are broadly consistent with the
previous literature on bank merger and stock market performance: the typical bank merger did not
improve post-merger financial performance, and investors were unable to accurately predict the future
performance of the typical bank merger.  However, when we analyze these data in a statistical framework
that allows for the possibility that banks and investors can learn from observing the best and worst
practices of previous bank M&As, we find evidence of improved post-merger financial performance as
well as evidence of more accurate stock market predictions of this performance.
Our framework is based on two broad conjectures about information, merger execution, and
merger valuation.  We hypothesize that bank managers can “learn-by-observing” information that spills
over from recent bank mergers, and we distinguish this passive learning from the more traditional notion
of active “learning-by-doing.”  Although we find no systematic evidence of the latter, we do find
persistent evidence consistent with the possibility that merging banks learn-by-observing.  More exactly,
we find that improvements in post-merger financial performance are positively associated with the
quantity of observable bank mergers announced and in-process during the previous several years.32
Similarly, we hypothesize that investors will become better able to accurately value bank mergers
by observing the financial performance of previous bank mergers.  Indeed, we find evidence consistent
with this conjecture that the stock market learns-by-observing.  More exactly, we find that the correlation
between short-run market reactions and long-run post-merger financial performance is positively
associated with the quantity of observable bank mergers during the previous several years.  These results
are statistically strong for broad measures of post-merger financial performance like ROA and ROE, and
statistically non-significant for more narrow measures of post-merger financial performance like
noninterest income, loan-to-asset ratios, and interest rate margins—a sensible result consistent with
investors that price bottom line impacts rather than individual operational improvements at the post-
merger bank.
Both of these broad conjectures are predicated on the fact that the large and often complex
commercial bank mergers of the late-1980s and the 1990s were a relatively new phenomenon.  To make
these mergers productive, managers and consultants had to first develop a set of best merger practices,
which could only be based on the accumulation of information spillovers from previous bank mergers.
Lacking a track record of previous bank merger performance, investors could only base their evaluations
on the accumulation of observable information about what kind of bank mergers tended to do well or do
poorly.  Importantly, while it took time for banks to develop best merger practices and for investors to
develop a deep information set about bank mergers, our statistical results are not merely proxies for the
passage of time, as we obtain our results in regression tests that control for time, relevant measures of
technological advance, business cycles, and other time-related arguments.  Moreover, our strongest results
occur in the first year after previous mergers are observed, which suggests that (a) best practices for bank
M&As is a moving target that evolved with changes in technology, competitive strategy, and market
conditions during the 1980s and 1990s and (b) knowledge spillover intensifies with “event density” in a
fashion similar to the informational benefits generated by “geographic density” documented in the urban
economics literature (see footnote 1).33
Our findings help explain why extant academic studies have rejected the notion that bank mergers
create value.  Furthermore, our findings suggest that the stock market may be a poor evaluator of new
phenomena that are poorly or incompletely understood by market participants, and we note that this
“failing” of the market is consistent with a semi-strong theory of market efficiency.
Finally, we stress that our findings should be interpreted with caution.  While our tests indicate
that the data are consistent with our hypotheses about experience effects and information spillover, we
emphasize that our main test variable is only a proxy for these phenomena.  We do not directly observe
the transformation of accumulated experience and/or information spillover into applied knowledge.  In
addition, our hypotheses are not derived from a formal underlying theory of learning in the banking
industry.34
References
Agrawal, A., J.F. Jaffe, and G.N. Mandelker.  1992.  The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A
Re-examination of an Anomaly.  The Journal of Finance 47: 1605-1621.
Akhavein, J.D., A.N. Berger, and D.B. Humphrey.  1997.  The effects of megamergers on efficiency and
prices: Evidence from a bank profit function.  Review of Industrial Organization 12: 95-139.
Alchian, A.  1963.  Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production.  Econometrica 31: 679-693.
Almeida, P. and Kogut, B.  1999.  Localization of knowledge and the mobility of engineers in regional
networks Management Science 45: 905-917.
Altunbas, Y. and D.M. Ibánez.  2005.  Mergers and Acquisitions and Bank Performance in Europe: The Role
of Strategic Similarities.  European Central Bank Working Paper No. 398.
Arrow, K.  1963.  The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.  Review of Economic Studies, June: 155-
173.
Asher, H.  1956.  Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe Industry.  Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation.
Becher, D. 2000.  The valuation effects of bank mergers.  Journal of Corporate Finance 6: 189-214.
Beitel, Patrick, Dirk Schiereck, and Mark Wahrenburg.  2002.  Explaining the M&A-success in European
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions.  European Business School, working paper.
Berger, A.N., R.S. Demsetz, and P.E. Strahan.  1999.  The consolidation of the financial services industry:
Causes, consequences, and implications for the future.  Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 135-194.
Berger, A.N., A. Saunders, J. Scalise, and G. Udell.  1998.  The effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on
small business lending.  Journal of Financial Economics 50: 187-229.
Bliss, R.T., and R.J. Rosen.  1999.  CEO compensation and bank mergers.  Indiana University, Working
paper.
Bush, N.  2004.  Bank Mergers: Hit or Myth?  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Proceedings from a
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (forthcoming).
Carlino, G.A.  2001.  Knowledge Spillovers: Cities’ Role in the New Economy.  Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, Business Review Q4: 17-26.
Cornett, M.M., and S. De.  1991.  Common stock returns in corporate takeover bids: evidence from interstate
bank mergers.  Journal of Banking and Finance 15: 273-295.
Cornett, M.M. and H. Tehranian.  1992.  Changes in Corporate Performance Associated with Bank
Acquisition.  Journal of Financial Economics 31: 211-234.35
DeLong, G.L.  2001.  Stockholder Gains from Focusing versus Diversifying Bank Mergers.  Journal of
Financial Economics 59: 221-252.
DeLong, G.  2003a.  The Announcement Effects of U.S. Versus Non-U.S. Bank Mergers: Do They Differ?
The Journal of Financial Research 26: 487-500.
DeLong, G.  2003b.  Does Long-Term Performance of Mergers Match Market Expectations? Evidence from
the U.S. Banking Industry.  Financial Management 32: 5-26.
Demsetz, R.S., and P.E. Strahan.  1997.  Diversification, size, and risk at bank holding companies.  Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 29: 300-313.
DeYoung, R.  1997.  Bank Mergers, X-Efficiency, and the Market for Corporate Control.  Managerial
Finance 23: 32-47.
DeYoung, R.  2005.  The Performance of Internet-based Business Models: Evidence from the Banking
Industry.  Journal of Business 78: 893-947.
DeYoung, R. and T. Rice.  2004.  Noninterest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial
Banks, Financial Review 39(1): 101-127.
Eckbo, B.E., R.M. Giammarino, and R.L. Heinkel.  1990.  Asymmetric Information and the Medium of
Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests.  Review of Financial Studies 3: 651-75.
Flannery, M.  1999.  Comment on Milbourn, Boot, Thakor.  Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 215-220.
Gemawat, P.  1985.  Building strategy on the experience curve.  Harvard Business Review, March-April: 143-
149.
Gervais, S. and T. Odean.  2001.  Learning to be Overconfident.  Review of Financial Studies 14: 1-27.
Griliches, Z.  1979.  Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity
Growth.  Bell Journal of Economics 10: 92-116.
Halpern, P. 1983. Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases?  A Review of Event Studies Applied to
Acquisitions.  Journal of Finance 38: 297-317.
Hart, J.R., and V.P. Ipilado.  2002.  Inexperienced Banks and Interstate Mergers.  Journal of Economics and
Business 54: 313-330.
Hartley, K. and W. Corcoran.  1978.  The Time-Cost Trade-off for Airliners.  Journal of Industrial
Economics 26: 209-222.
Healy, P.M., K.G. Palepu, and R.S. Ruback. 1992.  Does Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers?
Journal of Financial Economics 31: 135-175.
Houston, J.F. and M. Ryngaert.  1994.  The Overall Gains from Large Bank Mergers.  Journal of Banking and
Finance 18: 1155-1176.36
Houston, J.F., C.M. James, and M.D. Ryngaert.  2001.  Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers
from the perspective of insiders and outsiders.  Journal of Financial Economics 60: 285-331.
Howe, W.  2004.  A Brief History of the Internet.  The Internet Learning Center.  www.walthowe.com.
Hughes, J.P., W. Lang, L.J. Mester, and C.G. Moon.  1999.  The dollars and sense of bank consolidation.
Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 291-324.
Irwin, D.A. and Klenow, P.J.  1994.  Learning-by-doing spillovers in the semiconductor industry.  The
Journal of Political Economy 102: 1200-1227.
James, C., and P. Wier.  1987.  Returns to acquirers and competition in the acquisition market: the case of
banking.  Journal of Political Economy 95: 355-370.
Jensen, M. and R. Ruback.  1983. The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence. Journal of
Financial Economics 11: 5-50.
Jovanovic, B. and Y. Nyarko. 1996. Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology, Econometrica 64:
1299-1310.
Kwan, S. and D. Wilcox.  1999.  Hidden Cost Reductions in Bank Mergers: Accounting For More Productive
Banks.  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  Proceedings from a Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition: 533-547.
Leshchinkskii, D. and M. Zollo.  2004.  Can Firms Learn to Acquire?  The Impact of Post-Acquisition
Decisions and Learning on Long-Term Abnormal Performance.  Wharton School working paper.
Marshall, A.  1890.  Principles of Economics.  London: Macmillan.
Merlo, A. and A. Schotter.  2001. Learning By Not Doing: An Experimental Investigation of Observational
Learning.  CEPR working paper.
Mørck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1990. Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? Journal of
Finance 45: 31-48.
Myers, S. and N.S. Majluf. 1984.  Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information that Investors Do Not Have.  Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.
Ofek, E. and Sarvary, M.  2001.  Leveraging the customer base: Creating competitive advantage through
knowledge management.  Management Science 47: 1441-1456.
Pastor, L. and P. Veronesi. 2003.  Stock Valuation and Learning about Profitability.  Journal of Finance 58:
1749-1789.
Pilloff, S.J.  1996.  Performance Changes and Shareholder Wealth Creation Associated with Mergers of
Publicly Traded Banking Institutions.  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 28: 294-310.
Pilloff, S.J. and A.M. Santomero.  1998.  The value effects of bank mergers and acquisition, in G. Miller, ed.:
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA).37
Rau, P. R.  2000.  Investment bank market share, contingent fee payments, and the performance of
acquiring firms.  Journal of Financial Economics 56: 293-324.
Remolona, E.M. and K.C. Wulfekuhler.  1992.  Finance companies, bank competition, and niche markets.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Quarterly Review, Summer: 25-38.
Rosen, Richard.  2003.  Merger momentum and investor sentiment: the stock market reaction to merger
announcements.  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago working paper.
Zhang, H.  1997.  Repeated Acquirers in FDIC-Assisted Bank Acquisitions.  Journal of Banking and Finance
10: 1419-1430.38
Endnotes
                                                          
1 The idea that a dense economic landscape makes knowledge more likely to spill over between firms in
the same industry dates to Alfred Marshall (1890).  Carlino (2001) provides an overview of how urban
characteristics impact knowledge spillovers, product innovation, and local economic growth.
2 This mixed evidence for bank mergers parallels the evidence for mergers in general.  For example,
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) found statistically significant gains in post-merger operating
performance, while Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) found statistically significant stock market
losses over a five-year post-merger period.
3 Although this database includes mergers announced and completed as far back as 1979, in the years
prior to 1987 only a small number of bank mergers met our sample selection criteria.
4 These distinctions are based on the geographic focus and activity focus variables defined below in
section VI.
5 The industry averages are asset-weighted and hence are dominated by the performance of large banks,
which is appropriate for the merging banks in our sample.
6 For example, see comments made by Nancy Bush, “Bank Mergers: Hit or Myth?,” Proceedings from a
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank  of Chicago, May 2004.
7 The technology trend variables were constructed based on annual OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) data for the U.S. during the merger announcement year.  We did not
include any Internet-related time series, because the Internet was not widely accessible until relatively late
in our 1987-1999 sample period.  For example, the first commercial online Internet service (Delphi) was
not introduced until 1992 and the first graphical web browser (Mosiac) was not introduced until 1993
(Howe 2004).  Banks did not offer Internet services until 1995, when Wells-Fargo first offered online
account access to their customers and Security First Network Bank became the first Internet-only bank
(DeYoung 2005).
8 Between 1987 and 1993, the annual failure rate of U.S. commercial banks varied between 0.5% and
1.5%.  Since then the annual failure rate has never exceeded 0.1%. In alternative specifications we
replaced target_equity-to-assets with a pre-1994 dummy.  However, the statistical fit in these regressions
was poor, and the results suggested colinearity among this dummy, time, and LBYO.
9 We thank Hamid Mehran for access to these data.
10 We calculate the percent change in ROA associated with a ten per cent increase in LBYO(3) as follows:
%∆ROA = (.02843−.00290*7.8935)*(.7263*.10)/(.0108)  = 3.70%,39
                                                                                                                                                                                          
where .02843 and .00290 are the coefficient estimates for LBYO(3) and LBYO(3)*time from equation (4);
7.8935 and .7263 are the mean values of time and LBYO(3) from Table 5; and .0108 is the pre-merger
(one year prior) value of ROA for the average acquiring bank in our sample.  We calculate the percent
changes in the other performance measures in a similar fashion:
%∆ROE = (.32817−.03621*7.8935)*(.7263*.10)/(.1377) = 2.28%.
%∆Interest Margin = (.02329−.00212*7.8935)*(.7263*.10)/(.0384) = 1.25%.
%∆Efficiency Ratio = (−.45976+.04169*7.8935)*(.7263*.10)/(.6313) = −1.50%.
11 We calculate the percent change in CAR associated with a one standard deviation increase in ∆ROA in
the median information state as follows:
%∆CAR  =  (−4.3783 + 6.0207*.7030)*(.0046)  =  −.0007.
where -4.3783 and 6.0207 are the coefficient estimates for ∆ROA and LYBO(3)*∆ROA from equation (5);
.7030 is the median value of LBYO(3) from Table 5; and .0046 is the standard deviation of ∆ROA from
Table 5.  For the 75
th percentile information state the calculation is as follows:
%∆CAR  =  (−4.3783 + 6.0207*.9895)*(.0046)  =  .0073.
12 We also estimated equation (5) using the following alternative specifications, none of which altered our
main results (results not shown): adding the time trend variable to the right-hand-side of the equation,
adding any of our four technological change variables to the right-hand-side of the equation, and
replacing the continuous LBYO variables with dummy variables equal to 1 if merger occurred during an
“above-median” information state.40
Table I
Data for 216 M&As between publicly traded U.S. commercial banking companies




















1987-1999 216 $28.5 $7.4 108  (50.0%) 108  (50.0%)
By year of merger announcement
1987 13 $22.7 $4.7 2  (15%) 6  (46%)
1988 8 $17.2 $6.1 4  (50%) 7  (88%)
1989 12 $14.8 $2.2 7  (58%) 2  (17%)
1990 4 $6.3 $1.3 1  (25%) 2  (50%)
1991 21 $41.0 $10.5 11  (52%) 15  (71%)
1992 18 $28.4 $4.0 8  (44%) 11  (61%)
1993 20 $24.9 $2.8 10  (50%) 10  (50%)
1994 14 $37.9 $2.9 10  (71%) 4  (29%)
1995 20 $43.4 $14.7 11  (55%) 11  (55%)
1996 19 $11.7 $1.0 12  (63%) 6  (32%)
1997 29 $34.7 $6.9 14  (48%) 11  (38%)
1998 24 $27.7 $18.3 12  (50%) 14  (58%)
1999 14 $25.3 $7.9 6  (43%) 8  (57%)
Sources: Thomson Securities Data, Federal Reserve Y-9 Reports, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports).
Notes:  Asset amounts are reported in 2002 dollars.  A merger has Geographic Focus if the merging
banks’ geographic markets overlap more than the sample median.  A merger has Activity Focus if the
correlation between the merging banks’ stock returns exceeds the sample median.41
Table II
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to stockholders upon merger announcement.  Means with standard
deviations in parentheses.  Data for 216 M&As between publicly traded U.S. commercial banking











-10 days to +1 day 0.30% -2.39%*** 16.43%***
(5.21) (5.11) (16.20)
-10 days to +5 days -0.39% -3.16%*** 15.05%***
(5.92) (6.03) (24.44)
-10 days to +10 days -0.26% -3.09%*** 14.96%***
(6.92) (7.36) (24.57)
-5 days to +5 days -0.47% -3.15%*** 13.92%***
(5.24) (5.65) (22.89)
Sources:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant differences from zero, respectively, at the 1, 5, and
10 percent levels of significance in two-sided tests.42
Table III
Subsample averages for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to stockholders upon merger announcement.
Means with standard deviations in parentheses.  Data for 216 M&As between publicly traded U.S.
commercial banking companies that were announced and completed between 1987 and 1999.  CARs are















combined CAR 0.30 0.22 0.39 0.17
(5.21) (5.23) (5.22) (5.22)
acquirer CAR -2.39*** -2.04%*** -2.73*** -0.69
(5.11) (4.71) (5.47) (5.11)
target CAR 16.43*** 14.89%*** 17.98*** 3.09
(16.20) (16.17) (16.15) (16.16)
Sources:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels of significance in two-sided tests.43
Table IV
Change in long-run financial performance ratios (∆post-merger performance) for merged banks.  Means
with standard deviations in parentheses.  Data for 216 M&As between publicly traded U.S. commercial
banking companies that were announced and completed between 1987 and 1999.  The ∆post-merger
performance is measured on a window from -1 to +3 years around the merger completion date and is















∆ROA -0.05* -0.17*** 0.06 0.23***
(0.45) (0.50) (0.37) (0.44)
∆ROE -0.62 -2.08*** 0.84* 2.92***
(6.19) (7.43) (4.77) (6.24)
∆Interest Margin 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.07
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
∆Cost Efficiency -0.47 1.37* -2.32*** -3.69***
(7.82) (8.57) (6.52) (7.61)
∆Loans-to-Assets 5.25*** 4.58*** 5.92*** 1.34
(7.46) (7.07) (7.82) (7.45)
∆Core Deposits-to-Assets 2.64*** 0.26 5.02*** 4.76***
(7.32) (7.19) (6.68) (6.94)
∆Noninterest-Income Ratio -0.12*** 0.08** -0.32*** -0.40***
(0.50) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46)
Sources:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels of significance in two-sided tests.44
Table V
Summary Statistics for Regression Variables.  Data for 216 M&As between publicly traded U.S.
commercial banking companies that were announced and completed between 1987 and 1999.
Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum Median
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆post-merger performance
∆ROA -0.00055 0.0046 -0.0192 0.0158 0.00006
∆ROE -0.0062 0.0640 -0.2118 0.2650 0.0037
∆Interest Margin 0.0003 0.0044 -0.0119 0.0134 -0.0002
∆Cost Efficiency -0.0047 0.0782 -0.2855 0.3298 -0.0085
∆Loans-to-Assets 0.0525 0.0746 -0.1476 0.3178 0.0556
∆Core Deposits-to-Assets 0.0264 0.0732 -0.2187 0.2002 0.0280
∆Noninterest Income Ratio -0.0012 0.0050 -0.0153 0.0205 -0.0012
market reaction
CAR 0.0030 0.0521 -0.1019 0.2379 -0.0027
information spillover
LBYO(1) in thousands 0.2464 0.0852 0.0540 0.4370 0.2570
LBYO(2) 0.4927 0.1621 0.2060 0.7670 0.5170
LBYO(3) 0.7263 0.2465 0.3630 1.0710 0.7030
LBYO(4) 0.9398 0.3146 0.4900 1.3320 0.8430
LBYO(5) 1.1334 0.3483 0.6960 1.6130 0.9990
LBYO(6) 1.3051 0.3631 0.8670 1.8690 1.0980
LBYO(7) 1.4502 0.3737 0.8660 2.0660 1.2320
weighted LBYO 0.8082 0.2479 0.4776 1.1199 0.7439
time and technological change
time 7.8935 3.5164 1.0000 13.0000 8.0000
cellphones_pc 0.1231 0.0972 0.0050 0.3151 0.0926
computers_pc 0.3208 0.1027 0.1544 0.5163 0.2973
ATMtrans_pc in thousands 0.0325 0.0084 0.0161 0.0414 0.0318
cashless_pc in thousands 0.3057 0.0358 0.2420 0.3632 0.2999
control variables
GDP growth 3.2704 1.3327 -0.2000 4.5000 3.6000
LBYD 3.9352 4.3504 0.0000 26.0000 3.0000
target equity-to-assets 0.0804 0.0211 0.0235 0.1756 0.0769
activity focus 0.4954 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
geographic focus 0.5000 0.5012 0.0000 1.0000 0.5000
log acquirer assets $16.3733 $1.3838 $13.1001 $19.3936 $16.5518
equal size 0.7776 0.2470 0.0166 0.9959 0.8587
megamerger 0.5370 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
CEO tenure 7.1481 5.2789 0.0000 29.0000 6.0000
CEO stock 0.4788 1.3159 0.0100 12.2500 0.1600
post-merger growth 0.0488 0.1062 -0.3000 0.3000 0.0419
state M&As 0.0545 0.0440 0.0000 0.2131 0.0428
∆HHI -0.0013 0.0133 -0.0525 0.0757 -0.0006
hot market 0.0022 0.0188 -0.0401 0.0602 0.0018
percent stock 0.8668 0.3114 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
pooling 0.5321 0.5001 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
hostile 0.0139 0.1173 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
Notes:  Dollar-denominated variables expressed in 2002 dollars.
Sources: Federal Reserve Y-9 Reports, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Reports of Condition and Income
(Call Reports), CRSP database, Thomson Financial Securities Data, and authors’ calculations.45
Table VI
OLS regression results for equation (4). Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
Dependent Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income
Ratio
constant -0.00545 -0.01581 -0.00188 0.03088 0.25630** -0.10889 -0.01387**
(0.00606) (0.08650) (0.00592) (0.10901) (0.10589) (0.10377) (0.00661)
LBYO(3) 0.02843*** 0.32817*** 0.02329*** -0.45976*** 0.12418 0.17272 0.00226
(0.00683) (0.09741) (0.00666) (0.11548) (0.13521) (0.11098) (0.00810)
Time 0.00122** 0.01555* 0.00180*** -0.01882** 0.00724 0.01279 0.00119*
(0.00053) (0.00820) (0.00051) (0.00917) (0.01015) (0.00877) (0.00063)
LBYO(3)*time -0.0029*** -0.03621*** -0.00212*** 0.04169*** -0.00972 -0.00700 -0.0017*
(0.00073) (0.01064) (0.00073) (0.01281) (0.01432) (0.01153) (0.00092)
GDP growth -0.00015 -0.00033 -0.00094*** 0.00239 -0.00611 -0.00836* 0.000457
(0.00030) (0.00423) (0.00029) (0.00533) (0.00518) (0.00508) (0.00032)
Target equity-to-assets -0.12173*** -1.61234*** 0.05592* 1.18157** -0.17381 0.58846 -0.00502
(0.03256) (0.46458) (0.03181) (0.58547) (0.56868) (0.55733) (0.03552)
trgt eqty-to-assts*time 0.01206*** 0.16733*** -0.00797** -0.10531 -0.01101 -0.07722 0.00336
(0.00384) (0.05482) (0.00375) (0.06908) (0.06710) (0.06576) (0.00419)
activity focus -0.00026 -0.00568 0.000642 -0.00671 -0.01824 -0.0083 -0.00054
(0.00068) (0.00977) (0.00067) (0.01231) (0.01196) (0.01172) (0.00075)
geographic focus -0.0011* -0.01148 -0.00152*** 0.0048 -0.01727* -0.007 -0.00135**
(0.00060) (0.00855) (0.00059) (0.01078) (0.01047) (0.01026) (0.00065)
LBYD -3.7E-05 -0.00091 9E-05 0.000739 0.0033*** -0.00053 -3.3E-06
(0.00007) (0.00100) (0.00007) (0.00125) (0.00122) (0.00119) (0.00008)
post-merger growth -0.00925*** -0.10301*** -0.01676*** 0.0871* -0.10846** -0.056 -0.00575*
(0.00284) (0.04054) (0.00278) (0.05109) (0.04963) (0.04864) (0.00310)
log acquirer assets -0.00034 -0.00584 -0.00073*** 0.0093* -0.01656*** -0.001 0.00055*
(0.00027) (0.00390) (0.00027) (0.00491) (0.00477) (0.00468) (0.00030)
Equal size 0.00101 -0.00425 0.00176 -0.00249 0.02104 0.00724 0.00129
(0.00145) (0.02069) (0.00142) (0.02608) (0.02533) (0.02483) (0.00158)
megamerger 0.00181** 0.02233** 0.000616 -0.03204** 0.02014 0.00448 0.000438
(0.00080) (0.01140) (0.00078) (0.01436) (0.01395) (0.01367) (0.00087)
CEO tenure 6.46E-05 0.000569 4.32E-05 0.000166 0.000646 0.00226** 6.21E-05
(0.00005) (0.00077) (0.00005) (0.00097) (0.00094) (0.00092) (0.00006)
CEO stock 5.12E-05 0.000177 0.000609*** 0.00123 0.01456*** 0.00603 -0.00037
(0.00023) (0.00334) (0.00023) (0.00421) (0.00409) (0.00401) (0.00026)
percent stock -0.00083 -0.01156 -0.00099 0.03339* -0.00471 -0.0107 0.000458
(0.00105) (0.01501) (0.00103) (0.01892) (0.01838) (0.01801) (0.00115)
pooling 0.000612 0.00583 0.000202 -0.02432* -0.00176 0.00845 0.000184
(0.00073) (0.01042) (0.00071) (0.01313) (0.01276) (0.01250) (0.00080)
hostile 0.000316 -0.05718 0.000169 -0.05406 -0.05486 -0.02158 0.00159
(0.00251) (0.03587) (0.00246) (0.04521) (0.04391) (0.04303) (0.00274)
hot market -0.01799 -0.31414 -0.02053 -0.11967 -0.1434 -0.0981 -0.01246
(0.01642) (0.23426) (0.01604) (0.29522) (0.28676) (0.28103) (0.01791)
state M&As 0.0096 0.15955* -0.00193 -0.17528 0.01419 -0.15463 -0.00934
(0.00685) (0.09768) (0.00669) (0.12309) (0.11956) (0.11718) (0.00747)
∆HHI -0.05738*** -0.86394*** -0.00696 0.83954** -0.21863 -0.40722 -0.05178**
(0.02230) (0.31819) (0.02179) (0.40099) (0.38949) (0.38171) (0.02433)
adjusted-R
2 0.2418 0.2198 0.2176 0.1695 0.1405 0.1424 0.253246
Table VI (continued)
OLS regression results for equation (4). Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
Dependent
Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income
Ratio
derivative of dependent variable with respect to LBYO, evaluated at value of time in left-hand column:
time=1 0.0255*** 0.2920*** 0.0212*** -0.4181*** 0.1145 0.1657 0.0006
time=2 0.0226*** 0.2558*** 0.0191*** -0.3764*** 0.1048 0.1587 -0.0011
time=3 0.0197*** 0.2196** 0.0170*** -0.3347*** 0.0951 0.1517 -0.0028
time=4 0.0168*** 0.1834* 0.0149** -0.2930*** 0.0854 0.1447 -0.0045
time=5 0.0139** 0.1472 0.0128** -0.2513** 0.0757 0.1377 -0.0062
time=6 0.0110 0.1110 0.0107 -0.2096* 0.0660 0.1307 -0.0079
time=7 0.0081 0.0748 0.0086 -0.1679 0.0563 0.1237 -0.0096
time=8 0.0052 0.0386 0.0065 -0.1262 0.0466 0.1167 -0.0113
time=9 0.0023 0.0024 0.0044 -0.0845 0.0369 0.1097 -0.0130
time=10 -0.0006 -0.0338 0.0023 -0.0428 0.0272 0.1027 -0.0147*
time=11 -0.0035 -0.0700 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0175 0.0957 -0.0164**
time=12 -0.0064 -0.1062 -0.0019 0.0406 0.0078 0.0887 -0.0181**
time=13 -0.0093 -0.1424 -0.0040 0.0823 -0.0019 0.0817 -0.0198**
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant
difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.47
Table VII
Selected OLS regression results from alternative specifications of equation (4) in which the time trend
variable (top panel results repeated from Table VI) is replaced with technology trend variables cellphones
per capita, computers per capita, ATM transactions per capita, and cashless transactions per capita.
Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
Dependent Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income Ratio
base case (repeated from Table VI)
LBYO(3) 0.02843*** 0.32817*** 0.02329*** -0.45976*** 0.12418 0.17272 0.00226
(0.00683) (0.09741) (0.00666) (0.11548) (0.13521) (0.11098) (0.00810)
Time 0.00122** 0.01555* 0.00180*** -0.01882** 0.00724 0.01279 0.00119*
(0.00053) (0.00820) (0.00051) (0.00917) (0.01015) (0.00877) (0.00063)
LBYO(3)*time -0.0029*** -0.03621*** -0.00212*** 0.04169*** -0.00972 -0.00700 -0.00170*
(0.00073) (0.01064) (0.00073) (0.01281) (0.01432) (0.01153) (0.00092)
time trend replaced with cell phones per capita
LBYO(3) 0.01191*** 0.11191** 0.01322*** -0.20111*** 0.07043 0.11488* -0.00519
(0.00308) (0.04555) (0.00336) (0.05727) (0.07342) (0.06340) (0.00412)
cellphones_pc 0.03353 0.27566 0.02629 -0.19270 0.08319 -0.40142 0.04673*
(0.02717) (0.37680) (0.02585) (0.46620) (0.49101) (0.42850) (0.02702)
LBYO(3)*cellphones_pc -0.07769*** -0.84599** -0.05908** 0.85574* -0.22160 0.22503 -0.06424*
(0.02536) (0.36547) (0.02670) (0.47473) (0.56628) (0.45733) (0.03342)
time trend replaced with computers per capita
LBYO(3) 0.02175*** 0.23480** 0.02863*** -0.35414*** 0.11045 0.20149 0.00534
(0.00759) (0.11502) (0.00760) (0.13183) (0.16075) (0.13799) (0.00931)
computers_pc 0.01280 0.11724 0.04358** -0.13756 0.07377 0.14589 0.04030*
(0.02524) (0.37043) (0.02124) (0.41948) (0.42949) (0.38985) (0.02304)
LBYO(3)*computers_pc -0.06015** -0.71508* -0.07160*** 0.82421** -0.21182 -0.23183 -0.05581*
(0.02433) (0.36624) (0.02359) (0.41936) (0.48903) (0.40815) (0.02926)
time trend replaced with ATM transactions per capita
LBYO(3) 0.04084*** 0.45063*** 0.01996 -0.57484*** 0.14294 0.01661 0.02248
(0.01212) (0.17496) (0.01288) (0.22390) (0.26784) (0.21550) (0.01586)
ATMtrans 0.57299*** 7.19838** 0.71918*** -8.90339** 3.23072 4.59913 0.55083**
(0.22354) (3.39000) (0.22477) (3.83567) (4.54691) (3.74923) (0.27475)
LBYO(3)*ATMtrans_pc -1.02760*** -12.1106*** -0.53154 13.52462** -3.20166 1.02867 -0.92837***
(0.31299) (4.50184) (0.33826) (5.68475) (6.88744) (5.49052) (0.42183)
time trend replaced with cashless transactions per capita
LBYO(3) 0.07715*** 0.90715*** 0.07675*** -1.14544*** 0.33541 0.40478 0.04408
(0.02063) (0.30979) (0.02154) (0.36491) (0.44380) (0.36275) (0.02822)
cashless 0.07734 0.83816 0.17196*** -1.14135 0.64934 1.06337 0.13264*
(0.06380) (0.96932) (0.05612) (1.13571) (1.17353) (1.05466) (0.06910)
LBYO(3)*cashless_pc -0.23594*** -2.84398*** -0.22999*** 3.34047*** -0.94708 -0.92624 -0.18238*
(0.06709) (1.00894) (0.06965) (1.19213) (1.42071) (1.15629) (0.09173)
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant
difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.48
Table VIII
Selected OLS regression results from alternative specifications of equation (4) using weighted and
unweighted cumulative-year variations of the LBYO variable.  Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and
1999.
Dependent Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income
Ratio
Panel 1:  Previous mergers are weighted
weighted LBYO 0.02849*** 0.29580*** 0.02744*** -0.53033*** 0.17849 0.31557*** -0.01167
(0.00737) (0.10185) (0.00668) (0.11651) (0.13060) (0.11867) (0.00805)
weighted LBYO*time -0.00310*** -0.03586*** -0.00275*** 0.05222*** -0.01630 -0.02429** -0.00046
(0.00074) (0.01042) (0.00069) (0.01205) (0.01318) (0.01157) (0.00086)
Panel 2:  Previous mergers are not weighted
LBYO(1) 0.05579*** 0.62069*** 0.02337* -0.79957*** 0.50696** 0.19599 0.03743**
(0.01346) (0.19115) (0.01329) (0.29923) (0.23053) (0.25821) (0.01642)
LBYO(1)*time -0.00553*** -0.06557*** -0.00094 0.0735** -0.05913** -0.01124 -0.0067***
(0.00166) (0.02311) (0.00178) (0.03638) (0.02902) (0.03205) (0.00210)
LBYO(2) 0.03505*** 0.4132*** 0.01410 -0.52488*** 0.19091 0.1437 0.01936*
(0.00916) (0.13365) (0.00919) (0.17491) (0.18592) (0.15816) (0.01185)
LBYO(2)*time -0.00357 -0.0462*** -0.00062 0.04894** -0.01857 -0.00134 -0.0038***
(0.00107)*** (0.01542) (0.00111) (0.02053) (0.02140) (0.01820) (0.00143)
base case (repeated from Table VI)
LBYO(3) 0.02843*** 0.32817*** 0.02329*** -0.45976*** 0.12418 0.17272 0.00226
(0.00683) (0.09741) (0.00666) (0.11548) (0.13521) (0.11098) (0.00810)
LBYO(3)*time -0.0029*** -0.03621*** -0.00212*** 0.04169*** -0.00972 -0.00700 -0.0017*
(0.00073) (0.01064) (0.00073) (0.01281) (0.01432) (0.01153) (0.00092)
LBYO(4) 0.02342*** 0.24309*** 0.02251*** -0.42640*** 0.15399 0.23325** -0.01032
(0.00567) (0.07758) (0.00518) (0.09279) (0.10310) (0.09735) (0.00654)
LBYO(4)*time -0.00258*** -0.02945*** -0.00233*** 0.04281*** -0.01418 -0.01870** -0.00020
(0.00056) (0.00781) (0.00053) (0.00951) (0.01052) (0.00955) (0.00069)
LBYO(5) 0.01855*** 0.15940** 0.02073*** -0.37536*** 0.14157 0.29357*** -0.01789***
(0.00597) (0.08205) (0.00526) (0.09326) (0.09854) (0.09537) (0.00635)
LBYO(5)*time -0.00211*** -0.02145*** -0.00221*** 0.03858*** -0.01319 -0.02563*** 0.00076
(0.00055) (0.00751) (0.00049) (0.00858) (0.00930) (0.00873) (0.00062)
LBYO(6) 0.00968 0.06600 0.01478** -0.31966*** 0.10312 0.29726*** -0.02660***
(0.00684) (0.09273) (0.00612) (0.10261) (0.10033) (0.09802) (0.00592)
LBYO(6)*time -0.00128** -0.01237 -0.00164*** 0.03185*** -0.00979 -0.02518*** 0.00143***
(0.00060) (0.00808) (0.00052) (0.00847) (0.00827) (0.00805) (0.00047)
LBYO(7) -0.00325 -0.05619 0.00358 -0.14226 0.03673 0.23578** -0.02698***
(0.00726) (0.10068) (0.00654) (0.11857) (0.09642) (0.10422) (0.00592)
LBYO(7)*time -0.00037 -0.00412 -0.00079* 0.01793** -0.00465 -0.01855*** 0.00119***
(0.00056) (0.00775) (0.00048) (0.00830) (0.00666) (0.00727) (0.00038)
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant
difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.49
Table IX
Selected OLS regression results from alternative specifications of equation (4) using non-cumulative
(individual year) variations of the LBYO variable.  Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
Dependent Variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income
Ratio
LBYO(y1) 0.05579*** 0.62069*** 0.02337* -0.79957*** 0.50696** 0.19599 0.03743**
(0.01342) (0.19115) (0.01327) (0.29923) (0.23052) (0.25821) (0.01640)
LBYO(y1)*time -0.00553*** -0.06557*** -0.00094 0.07350** -0.05913** -0.01124 -0.0067***
(0.00166) (0.02311) (0.00178) (0.03637) (0.02902) (0.03205) (0.00210)
LBYO(y2) 0.00687 0.11547 -0.00254 -0.17009 -0.14405 0.24500 -0.00029
(0.01931) (0.28581) (0.01612) (0.36483) (0.27011) (0.29710) (0.01523)
LBYO(y2)*time -0.00092 -0.02118 0.00115 0.01302 0.01920 0.00269 -0.00253
(0.00203) (0.03013) (0.00174) (0.03766) (0.03061) (0.03106) (0.00177)
LBYO(y3) 0.02200 0.31287 0.03242** -0.53392* 0.09667 0.19644 -0.02955*
(0.01622) (0.22233) (0.01546) (0.30374) (0.24765) (0.29093) (0.01562)
LBYO(y3)*time -0.00271* -0.03790* -0.00388*** 0.04905* -0.00395 -0.00942 0.00067
(0.00146) (0.02037) (0.00139) (0.02678) (0.02252) (0.02532) (0.00138)
LBYO(y4) 0.02505 0.12726 0.03497** -0.61617** 0.44256* 0.45761 -0.05877***
(0.01980) (0.28187) (0.01670) (0.31599) (0.25567) (0.33581) (0.01723)
LBYO(y4)*time -0.00372** -0.03063 -0.00468*** 0.07942*** -0.04542* -0.05710* 0.00437***
(0.00175) (0.02427) (0.00143) (0.02793) (0.02366) (0.02993) (0.00157)
LBYO(y5) -0.00550 -0.20730 0.02038 -0.05284 -0.02147 0.71470** -0.02172
(0.01720) (0.25201) (0.01783) (0.31410) (0.28151) (0.32408) (0.02059)
LBYO(y5)*time -0.00153 -0.00667 -0.00426** 0.04080 -0.00739 -0.08985*** 0.00241
(0.00189) (0.02665) (0.00179) (0.03142) (0.02746) (0.03183) (0.00207)
LBYO(y6) -0.01485 -0.03276 0.00173 -0.15021 -0.08692 0.17774 0.00274
(0.02012) (0.30819) (0.01778) (0.31267) (0.23287) (0.24777) (0.01338)
LBYO(y6)*time -0.00064 -0.01343 -0.00300* 0.04986 -0.01204 -0.05324** -0.00026
(0.00207) (0.03102) (0.00182) (0.03151) (0.02460) (0.02550) (0.00138)
LBYO(y7) -0.00153 0.10270 0.00487 -0.19508 -0.00355 0.18717 0.01122
(0.01476) (0.22233) (0.01225) (0.24052) (0.17720) (0.19897) (0.00854)
LBYO(y7)*time -0.00102 -0.02039 -0.00196 0.06047* -0.01168 -0.04801* 0.00138
(0.00199) (0.02820) (0.00161) (0.03153) (0.02302) (0.02653) (0.00122)
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant
difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.50
Table X
OLS regression results for equation (5).  Dependent variable is CAR.  The definition for the ∆post-merger
performance variable changes across columns.  Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆post-merger
performance variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninterest
Income
Ratio
constant 0.13173** 0.13319** 0.13088** 0.14147** 0.14680** 0.14374** 0.12900**
(0.0612) (0.0612) (0.0620) (0.0619) (0.0645) (0.0615) (0.0624)
∆post-merger performance -4.37833** -0.31143** -1.90855 0.16846 -0.21588 -0.06408 1.51061
(2.1451) (0.1469) (2.4820) (0.1268) (0.1689) (0.1115) (2.4635)
LBYO(3) 0.03056 0.03030 0.02423 0.03087 0.01858 0.00688 0.02534
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0280) (0.0270) (0.0274)
LBYO(3)*∆performance 6.02077** 0.36707* 3.41057 -0.15975 0.25856 0.23609 -2.03662
(2.9800) (0.2112) (3.0096) (0.1742) (0.2099) (0.1524) (3.2540)
GDP growth -0.01067*** -0.01087*** -0.01106*** -0.01142*** -0.01194*** -0.01084*** -0.01158***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
target equity-to-assets -0.23784 -0.25405 -0.13162 -0.19143 -0.10396 -0.13039 -0.10835
(0.2567) (0.2579) (0.2513) (0.2484) (0.2445) (0.2422) (0.2497)
trgt eqty-to-assts*time 0.01263 0.01510 0.01024 0.01079 0.00721 0.00921 0.00801
(0.0227) (0.0230) (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0224)
activity focus 0.00688 0.00610 0.00801 0.00814 0.00765 0.01037 0.00751
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0079)
geographic focus -0.00373 -0.00440 -0.00358 -0.00415 -0.00383 -0.00215 -0.00414
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068)
LBYD -0.00033 -0.00035 -0.00023 -0.00028 -0.00002 -0.00016 -0.00026
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
post-merger growth -0.03408 -0.03962 -0.02581 -0.03808 -0.03866 -0.02267 -0.03172
(0.0358) (0.0349) (0.0386) (0.0365) (0.0352) (0.0353) (0.0356)
log acquirer assets -0.00290 -0.00295 -0.00283 -0.00359 -0.00352 -0.00326 -0.00278
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
equal size -0.04679** -0.04730** -0.04820** -0.04635** -0.04568** -0.04647** -0.04739**
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0223)
megamerger -0.01200 -0.01090 -0.01310 -0.01041 -0.01155 -0.01358 -0.01262
(0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0094)
CEO tenure 0.00048 0.00050 0.00039 0.00045 0.00045 0.00017 0.00038
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CEO stock 0.00047 0.00067 -0.00047 0.00069 -0.00013 -0.00038 0.00043
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0023)
percent stock -0.01822 -0.01802 -0.01693 -0.01856 -0.01668 -0.01568 -0.01613
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0130)
pooling 0.00147 0.00147 0.00281 0.00287 0.00157 0.00046 0.00216
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0090) (0.0092)
hostile 0.10156** 0.09912** 0.09969** 0.10697** 0.09757* 0.10430** 0.10273**
(0.0445) (0.0447) (0.0464) (0.0436) (0.0495) (0.0478) (0.0449)
hot market -0.48608*** -0.50606*** -0.48702*** -0.47625*** -0.47793*** -0.48868*** -0.48156***
(0.1823) (0.1819) (0.1805) (0.1821) (0.1825) (0.1819) (0.1794)
state M&As -0.07013 -0.06346 -0.06969 -0.06088 -0.06840 -0.06150 -0.07302
(0.0698) (0.0686) (0.0675) (0.0691) (0.0674) (0.0668) (0.0681)
∆HHI 0.28727 0.22332 0.27314 0.24760 0.27952 0.31225 0.24173
(0.3273) (0.3148) (0.3212) (0.3142) (0.3113) (0.3048) (0.3217)
adjusted-R
2 0.1455 0.1484 0.1373 0.1412 0.1395 0.1538 0.1325
∂CAR/∂∆performance:
    for LBYO(3) = median -0.1457 -0.0534 0.4891 0.0562 -0.0341 0.1019 0.0789
    for LBYO(3) = 75
th% 1.5792 0.0518 1.4662 0.0104 0.0400 0.1695** -0.5046
    for LBYO(3) = 90
th% 1.8411 0.0678 1.6146 0.0034 0.0512 0.1798** -0.5932
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant difference from
zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.51
Table XI
OLS regression results for equation (5) using weighted and unweighted cumulative-year variations of the
LBYO variable.  Dependent variable is CAR.  The definition for the ∆post-merger performance variable
changes across columns.  Data for 216 M&As between 1987 and 1999.
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆post-merger performance
variable: ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ROE ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Interest
Margin
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Efficiency
Ratio
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Loans-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Core
Deposits-to-
Assets
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆Noninteres
t Income
Ratio
LBYO excluded from regression
∆post-merger performance -0.27656 -0.07903 0.68675 0.05355 -0.02322 0.10620*** -0.28886
(0.72691) (0.05084) (0.81422) (0.04094) (0.04464) (0.04391) (0.65166)
LBYO variable = LBYO(1)
∆post-merger performance -4.93889** -0.40088*** -2.22855 0.19878* -0.10399 -0.01823 1.40613
(1.99423) (0.15214) (2.38312) (0.11632) (0.16142) (0.09978) (2.47251)
LBYO 0.06763 0.07110 0.02407 0.05870 0.03611 0.01884 0.03308
(0.04955) (0.04875) (0.05085) (0.04918) (0.05611) (0.05158) (0.05295)
LBYO*∆performance 19.39409*** 1.43390** 11.13943 -0.61279 0.30089 0.51576 -5.89529
(7.72297) (0.62926) (8.01328) (0.47467) (0.55089) (0.38771) (8.67702)
LBYO variable = LBYO(2)
∆post-merger performance -5.00903*** -0.37283*** -1.67775 0.24236** -0.22624 -0.03320 2.28604
(2.02171) (0.14404) (2.58069) (0.12051) (0.17885) (0.10438) (2.46041)
LBYO 0.05551* 0.05657* 0.03928 0.05061* 0.03109 0.02493 0.03772
(0.03085) (0.03103) (0.03229) (0.03011) (0.03626) (0.03375) (0.03439)
LBYO*∆performance 9.84350*** 0.66106** 4.25685 -0.38962* 0.39483 0.27235 -4.38615
(4.04819) (0.30105) (4.48075) (0.24088) (0.31945) (0.20066) (4.51200)
LBYO variable = LBYO(3)  (repeated from Table X)
∆post-merger performance -4.37833** -0.31143** -1.90855 0.16846 -0.21588 -0.06408 1.51061
(2.14513) (0.14695) (2.48199) (0.12676) (0.16891) (0.11151) (2.46345)
LBYO 0.03056 0.03030 0.02423 0.03087 0.01858 0.00688 0.02534
(0.02527) (0.02549) (0.02106) (0.02466) (0.02799) (0.02701) (0.02739)
LBYO*∆performance 6.02077*** 0.36707* 3.41057 -0.15975 0.25856 0.23609 -2.03662
(2.97995) (0.21125) (3.00964) (0.17424) (0.20992) (0.15236) (3.25399)
LBYO variable = weighted LBYO
∆post-merger performance -4.13028* -0.32307** -2.20281 0.12349 -0.22329 -0.07288 2.03168
(2.31445) (0.15838) (2.74502) (0.13824) (0.18084) (0.12865) (2.70371)
LBYO 0.04077 0.03858 0.03806 0.04225 0.03207 0.02210 0.04033
(0.02895) (0.02913) (0.02927) (0.02793) (0.03126) (0.03041) (0.03091)
LBYO*∆performance 5.13042* 0.34831* 3.51097 -0.08888 0.24474 0.21894 -2.35741
(2.83487) (0.20119) (3.16066) (0.17204) (0.20744) (0.16184) (3.34033)
Notes: Heteroscedastic-adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a significant
difference from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance, respectively, in two-sided tests.52
Figure 1
Change in Combined Cumulative Abnormal Return.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
completed between 1987 and 1999.  Linear trend time calculated using ordinary least squares.
Figure 2
Change in Acquiring Bank Cumulative Abnormal Return.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced
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Figure 3
Change in Target Bank Cumulative Abnormal Return.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
completed between 1987 and 1999.  Linear trend time calculated using ordinary least squares.
Figure 4
Change in Industry-Adjusted Return-on-Assets.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
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Figure 5
Change in Industry-Adjusted Return-on-Equity.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
completed between 1987 and 1999.  Linear trend time calculated using ordinary least squares.
Figure 6
Change in Industry-Adjusted Cost Efficiency.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
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Figure 7
Change in Industry-Adjusted Loans-to-Assets.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
completed between 1987 and 1999.  Linear trend time calculated using ordinary least squares.
Figure 8
Change in Industry-Adjusted Core Deposits-to-Assets.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
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Figure 9
Change in Industry-Adjusted Noninterest Income Ratio.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced
and completed between 1987 and 1999.  Linear trend time calculated using ordinary least squares.
Figure 10
Change in Industry-Adjusted Interest Margin.  Data for 216 U.S. banking M&As announced and
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Figure 11


























































































announced acquiring bank target bank
01/27/87 FIRST CHICAGO CORPORATION FIRST UNITED FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
2/9/1987 First of Amer Bk,Kalamazoo,MI BancServe Group,Rockford,IL
02/24/87 SECURITY PACIFIC CORPORATION RAINIER BANCORPORATION
03/18/87 FLEET/NORSTAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. NORSTAR BANCORP INC.
04/27/87 SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION COMMERCE UNION CORPORATION
4/27/1987 Old Kent Finl Corp,Michigan Illinois Regional Bancorp,IL
5/14/1987 First Interstate Bancorp Allied Bancshares,Houston,TX
05/19/87 U.S. BANCORP PEOPLES BAN CORPORATION
07/21/87 UJB FINANCIAL CORP. FIRST VALLEY CORPORATION
07/31/87 PNC FINANCIAL CORP. CENTRAL BANCORPORATION, INC., THE
09/25/87 BANK OF NEW YORK COMPANY, INC., THE IRVING BANK CORPORATION
10/09/87 FIRST UNION CORPORATION FLORIDA COMMERCIAL BANKS, INC.
11/19/1987 Marshall & Ilsley,Milwaukee,WI Central Wisconsin Bankshares
01/27/88 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION FIRST KENTUCKY NATIONAL CORPORATION
05/04/88 BOATMEN'S BANCSHARES, INC. CENTERRE BANCORPORATION
6/16/1988 KeyCorp,Albany,NY(Key Corp,OH) First Wyoming Bancorp,Cheyenne
06/28/88 SUMMIT BANCORPORATION, THE SOMERSET BANCORP, INC.
7/6/1988 NCNB Corp,Charlotte,NC First Republic Bank Corp
07/25/88 COMERICA INCORPORATED ALLIANCE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
7/25/1988 Fleet/Norstar Financial Grp,RI Indian Head Banks Inc, Nashua
09/22/88 PNC FINANCIAL CORP. BANK OF DELAWARE CORPORATION
01/23/89 FIRST OF AMERICA BANK CORPORATION MIDWEST FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
2/21/1989 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio Metropolitan Bancorp Inc
2/28/1989 Banknorth Group Inc,VT Howard Bancorp,Burlington,VT
3/7/1989 First Union Corp,Charlotte,NC Florida Nat Bks of Florida Inc
4/25/1989 First Chicago Corp,Illinois Ravenswood Financial Corp
06/19/89 SOCIETY CORPORATION TRUSTCORP, INC.
7/25/1989 Jefferson Bankshares Inc,VA Chesapeake Bank Corp
08/07/89 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP FIRST OHIO BANCSHARES, INC.
8/7/1989 Huntington Bancshares Inc,OH First Banc Securities Inc
8/10/1989 First Eastern Corp,PA First National Bk,Wyoming,PA
09/15/89 CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP FIRST PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION
9/21/1989 Wells Fargo Capital C Central Pacific Corp
03/23/90 NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION, INC. EASTCHESTER FINANCIAL CORPORATION
4/2/1990 Comerica Inc,Detroit,Michigan InBancshares
8/6/1990 Firstar Corp,Milwaukee,WI Banks of Iowa Inc
10/23/90 MAGNA GROUP, INC. LANDMARK BANCSHARES CORPORATION
03/25/91 NBD BANCORP, INC. FNW BANCORP, INC.
03/25/91 BANC ONE CORPORATION MARINE CORPORATION
05/15/91 KEYCORP AMERITRUST CORPORATION
6/3/1991 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio First Illinois Corp, Evanston
6/17/1991 First Union Corp,Charlotte,NC Southeast Banking Corp,Miami
6/20/1991 Wachovia Corp,Winston-Salem,NC South Carolina National
07/15/91 CHEMICAL BANKING CORPORATION MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORPORATION
07/31/91 BANKAMERICA CORPORATION VALLEY CAPITAL CORPORATION59
08/12/91 BANKAMERICA CORPORATION SECURITY PACIFIC CORPORATION
08/19/91 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP. F & M FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
09/12/91 FIRST OF AMERICA BANK CORPORATION SECURITY BANCORP, INC.
09/16/91 PNC BANK CORP. FIRST NATIONAL PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, THE
10/21/91 UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. SUMMIT HOLDING CORPORATION
10/28/91 COMERICA INCORPORATED MANUFACTURERS NATIONAL CORPORATION
10/30/91 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION MERCHANTS NATIONAL CORPORATION
10/31/1991 CNB Bancshares Inc,IN Indiana Bancshares Inc
11/8/1991 Chemical Banking Corp Community National Bank,NY
11/27/91 BANC ONE CORPORATION FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION OF KENTUCKY
12/11/91 PNC BANK CORP. CCNB CORPORATION
12/20/91 FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORPORATION SUMMCORP
12/30/91 BANC ONE CORPORATION AFFILIATED BANKSHARES OF COLORADO, INC.
01/27/92 DAUPHIN DEPOSIT CORPORATIO FB & T CORPORATION
02/14/92 CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP FIRST PEOPLES FINANCIAL CORPORATION
3/4/1992 KeyCorp,Albany,NY(Key Corp,OH) Puget Sound Bancorp,Tacoma,WA
03/05/92 BOATMEN'S BANCSHARES, INC. SUNWEST FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
03/18/92 FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORPORATION INB FINANCIAL CORPORATION
4/7/1992 Synovus Financial Corp,GA First Commercial Bancshares,AL
04/14/92 BANC ONE CORPORATION VALLEY NATIONAL CORPORATION
5/1/1992 Westamerica Bancorp,California Napa Valley Bancorp
05/18/92 BARNETT BANKS, INC. FIRST FLORIDA BANKS, INCORPORATED
06/05/92 BANC ONE CORPORATION KEY CENTURION BANCSHARES, INC.
7/17/1992 NationsBank Corp,Charlotte,NC MNC Financial Inc
7/22/1992 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio First Community Bancorp Inc
9/9/1992 Bank of Boston Corp,Boston,MA Multibank Financial Corp
09/21/92 FIRST UNION CORPORATION DOMINION BANKSHARES CORPORATION
10/23/92 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. FLAGLER BANK CORPORATION, THE
11/09/92 FIRST BANK SYSTEM, INC. COLORADO NATIONAL BANKSHARES, INC.
11/9/1992 Valley National Bancorp,NJ Peoples Bancorp,Marietta,OH
11/12/92 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED CB&T FINANCIAL CORP
1/29/1993 Bank of New York Co Inc,NY National Community Banks Inc
04/02/93 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION OHIO BANCORP
04/21/93 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED COMMERCE BANC CORPORATION
04/28/93 SOUTHTRUST CORPORATION BMR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
7/23/1993 Boatmen's Bancshares,St Louis First Amarillo Bancorp Inc
07/27/93 PNC BANK CORP. FIRST EASTERN CORP.
8/2/1993 CoreStates Financial Corp,PA Constellation Bancorp
08/05/93 ONE VALLEY BANCORP, INC. MOUNTAINEER BANKSHARES OF W. VA., INC.
8/11/1993 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio Capitol Bancorp Ltd,Lansing,MI
9/1/1993 Omega Financial Corp Penn Central Bancorp Inc
09/07/93 SUFFOLK BANCORP HAMPTONS BANCSHARES, INC.
09/09/93 COMERICA INCORPORATED PACIFIC WESTERN BANCSHARES, INC.
09/13/93 KEYCORP COMMERCIAL BANCORPORATION OF COLORADO
09/20/93 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORPORATION VALLEY BANCORPORATION
09/21/93 BANKBOSTON CORPORATION BANKWORCESTER CORPORATION
09/29/93 U.S. BANCORP BOULEVARD BANCORP, INC.
10/01/93 KEYCORP KEYCORP
11/02/93 OLD KENT FINANCIAL CORPORATION EDGEMARK FINANCIAL CORPORATION
11/03/93 BANC ONE CORPORATION LIBERTY NATIONAL BANCORP, INC.60
11/19/93 CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP INDEPENDENCE BANCORP, INC.
1/18/1994 Keystone Finl,Harrisburg,PA Frankford Corp
1/28/1994 BankAmerica Corp Continental Bank Corp NA
3/21/1994 First Fidelity Bancorp,NJ Baltimore Bancorp,Maryland
05/09/94 FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. NBB BANCORP, INC.
07/01/94 UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION GRENADA SUNBURST SYSTEM CORPORATION
07/12/94 MELLON BANK CORPORATION KEYSTONE FINANCIAL INC.
08/22/94 OLD KENT FINANCIAL CORPORATION FIRST NATIONAL BANK CORP.
09/22/94 MERCANTILE BANCORPORATION INC. CENTRAL MORTGAGE BANCSHARES, INC.
9/22/1994 First Tennessee National Corp Community Bancshares Inc,TN
10/5/1994 Comerica Inc,Detroit,Michigan University Bank & Trust Co,CA
10/06/94 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. NBSC CORPORATION
10/24/1994 Mason-Dixon Bancshares,MD Bank Maryland Corp,Maryland
10/24/1994 Chase Manhattan Corp US Trust Corp,New York,NY
12/12/1994 Centura Bank Inc,NC First Southern Bancorp,NC
02/21/95 FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. SHAWMUT NATIONAL CORPORATION
5/3/1995 Comerica Inc,Detroit,Michigan Metrobank NA
06/19/95 FIRST UNION CORPORATION FIRST FIDELITY BANCORPORATION
06/20/95 UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION CAPITAL BANCORPORATION, INC.
07/10/95 PNC BANK CORP. MIDLANTIC CORPORATION
07/19/95 BANK ONE CORPORATION PREMIER BANCORP, INCORPORATED
8/2/1995 UJB Financial Corp Flemington Natl Bank & Trust
08/07/95 U.S. BANCORP FIRSTIER FINANCIAL, INC.
08/23/95 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION METRO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
08/28/95 CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION, THE CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION
08/28/95 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION INTEGRA FINANCIAL CORPORATION
09/05/95 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION BANK SOUTH CORPORATION
09/11/95 SUMMIT BANCORP. SUMMIT BANCORPORATION, THE
9/29/1995 Whitney Holding Corp, First Citizens Bancstock
10/18/1995 Wells Fargo Capital C First Interstate Bancorp,CA
10/23/95 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION FIRST NATIONAL BANCORP
10/25/1995 Peoples Heritage Finl Group,ME Bank of New Hampshire Corp
11/21/1995 BT Financial Corp,Johnstown,PA Moxham Bank Corp
11/22/1995 F&M National,Winchester,VA FB&T Financial Corp
11/27/1995 Compass Bancshares Inc,AL CFB Bancorp Inc
4/22/1996 F&M National,Winchester,VA Allegiance Banc,Bethesda,MD
4/29/1996 Hudson United Bancorp,NJ Hometown Bancorporation Inc,CT
6/14/1996 Regions Financial Corp Allied Bankshares Inc,GA
6/21/1996 Hudson United Bancorp,NJ Westport Bancorp,Westport,CT
06/25/96 COMMUNITY FIRST BANKSHARES, INC. MOUNTAIN PARKS FINANCIAL C
7/15/1996 North Fork Bancorp,Melville,NY North Side Savings Bank,NY
8/29/1996 Summit Bancorp,Princeton,NJ BMJ Financial Corp,New Jersey
9/16/1996 Crestar Finl Corp,Richmond,VA Citizens Bancorp,Laurel,MD
9/16/1996 City National Bk,Beverly Hills Ventura County Natl Bancorp,CA
09/30/96 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC. CORPUS CHRISTI BANCSHARES,
10/14/96 COMMERCE BANCORP, INC. INDEPENDENCE BANCORP, INC.
10/16/1996 City National Bk,Beverly Hills Riverside Natl Bk,Riverside,CA
10/28/96 FIRST VIRGINIA BANKS, INC. PREMIER BANKSHARES CORPORATION
10/29/1996 Park National Corp,Newark,Ohio First-Knox Banc Corp
11/01/96 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED CITI-BANCSHARES, INC.61
11/04/96 BB&T CORPORATION UNITED CAROLINA BANCSHARES
11/12/96 WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION VALLICORP HOLDINGS, INC.
11/20/96 ZIONS BANCORPORATION ASPEN BANCSHARES, INC.
12/30/1996 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio Liberty Bancorp Inc,Oklahoma
02/14/97 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION NEW IBERIA BANCORP, INC., THE
02/19/97 UNITED BANKSHARES, INC. FIRST PATRIOT BANKSHARES CORPORATION
02/25/97 PACIFIC CENTURY FINANCIAL CORPORATION CU BANCORP
2/26/1997 MassBank Corp,Reading,MA Glendale Co-Operative Bank,MA
03/14/97 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORPORATION SECURITY CAPITAL CORPORATION
03/20/97 U.S. BANCORP U.S. BANCORP
05/05/97 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED FIRST MICHIGAN BANK CORPORATION
06/10/97 WACHOVIA CORPORATION JEFFERSON BANKSHARES, INC.
06/24/97 WACHOVIA CORPORATION CENTRAL FIDELITY BANKS, INC.
7/16/1997 Hibernia Corp,New Orleans,LA ArgentBank,Thibodaux,Louisiana
07/21/97 FIRST UNION CORPORATION SIGNET BANKING CORPORATION
8/4/1997 Union Planters Corp,Memphis,TN Capital Bancorp,Florida
08/07/97 WACHOVIA CORPORATION 1ST UNITED BANCORP
8/15/1997 Fulton Finl Corp,Lancaster,PA Keystone Heritage Group
08/29/97 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION BARNETT BANKS, INC.
9/11/1997 United Bankshares Inc,WV George Mason Bankshares Inc
9/12/1997 WesBanco Inc,Wheeling,WV Coml Bancshares,Parkersburg,WV
09/23/97 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION FIRST UNITED BANCORPORATION
09/24/97 ZIONS BANCORPORATION VECTRA BANKING CORPORATION
10/20/1997 BANC ONE Corp,Columbus,Ohio First Commerce,New Orleans,LA
10/28/97 M&T BANK CORPORATION ONBANCORP, INC.
11/03/97 FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION COBANCORP INC.
11/17/1997 Citizens Bancshares Inc,OH Century Finl Corp,Rochester,PA
11/18/97 WACHOVIA CORPORATION CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP
11/18/97 UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION PEOPLES FIRST CORPORATION
12/1/1997 National City Corp,Cleveland First of Amer Bk,Kalamazoo,MI
12/11/1997 Regions Financial Corp First State Corp,Albany,Ga
12/16/1997 BB&T Corp,Winston-Salem,NC Franklin Bancorp,Washington,DC
12/29/97 ZIONS BANCORPORATION FP BANCORP, INC.
01/09/98 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION FORT WAYNE NATIONAL CORPORATION
01/15/98 FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP, INC. HERITAGE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
1/21/1998 Union Planters Corp,Memphis,TN Merchants Bancshares Inc,TX
01/28/98 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION FIRST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION
02/23/98 UNION PLANTERS CORPORATION MAGNA GROUP, INC.
3/3/1998 Hudson United Bancorp,NJ Community Financial Hldg,NJ
3/26/1998 Zions Bancorp,Utah Sumitomo Bank of California
3/31/1998 Hudson United Bancorp,NJ Dime Financial Corp
3/31/1998 Union Planters Corp,Memphis,TN Ambanc Corp,Vincennes,Indiana
04/13/98 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION BANKAMERICA CORPORATION
04/13/98 BANK ONE CORPORATION FIRST CHICAGO NBD CORPORATION
5/21/1998 Citizens Bancshares Inc,OH Mid Am Inc,Bowling Green,Ohio
07/16/98 FIRST COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORPORATION SOUTHWEST NATIONAL CORPORATION
07/20/98 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. CRESTAR FINANCIAL CORPORATION
7/20/1998 Santa Barbara Bancorp,CA Pacific Capital Bancorp,CA
7/31/1998 Banknorth Group Inc,VT Evergreen Bancorp Inc
8/11/1998 FirstMerit Corp Signal Corp,Wooster,OH62
8/26/1998 BB&T Corp,Winston-Salem,NC MainStreet Financial Corp
9/4/1998 F&M Bancorp,Frederick,MD Monocacy Bancshares Inc
9/17/1998 Commerce Bancorp,New Jersey Prestige Financial Corp
12/10/1998 M&T Bank Corp,Buffalo,New York FNB Rochester Corp,NY
12/14/1998 Sky Financial Group Inc,OH First Western Bancorp Inc,PA
12/16/1998 Chittenden Corp,Burlington,VT Vermont Financial Services,VT
12/18/1998 Valley National Bancorp,NJ Ramapo Financial Corp
01/25/99 BSB Bancorp Inc,Binghamton,NY Skaneateles Bancorp Inc
01/28/99 BB&T Corp,Winston-Salem,NC Mason-Dixon Bancshares,MD
02/25/99 BB&T Corp,Winston-Salem,NC Matewan Bancshares Inc
03/14/99 Fleet Financial Group Inc,MA BankBoston Corp,Boston,MA
03/19/99 Synovus Financial Corp,GA Merit Holding Corp,Tucker,GA
04/19/99 Citizens Banking Corp,Flint,MI F&M Bancorp,Kaukauna,WI
05/19/99 CVB Financial Corp,Ontario,CA Orange National Bancorp
05/19/99 US Bancorp,Minneapolis,MN Western Bancorp,California
05/31/99 AmSouth Bancorp,Alabama First American Corp,Tennessee
6/7/1999 Sky Financial Group Inc,OH Mahoning National Bancorp
06/16/99 Fifth Third Bancorp,Cincinnati CNB Bancshares Inc,IN
7/9/1999 Fifth Third Bancorp,Cincinnati Peoples Bank Corp,Indiana
07/27/99 Camden National Corp KSB Bancorp Inc
7/30/1999 Tompkins TrustCo Inc,NY Letchworth Independent Bancshs1 
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